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ABSTRACT
At the beginning of 2011, Egypt witnessed radical political developments that led to
the emergence of a pressing tendency to adjudicate the collapsed regime’s policies and
practices. Shortly thereafter, the Egyptian State Council issued a number of judicial
decisions that confirmed that the sale of the privatized governmental enterprises had
been tainted by corruption. Crucially, the Court maintained that flagrant breach of law,
regulations, and administrative orders that encompassed these transactions created
serious suspicions about corruption committed by public officials and investors. It
concluded that the existence of corruption, as a transnational public policy
consideration, had deprived foreign investors of the opportunity to resort to
international arbitration. Beyond that, it affirmed that its decisions aimed at protecting
the state’s wealth and economy, and encouraging serious investments. However, when
Egypt, upon nearly identical circumstantial evidence invoked the issue of corruption as
a public policy consideration before ICSID arbitration, it was discarded due to lack of
evidence. This paper compares the position of both the national court and the
international arbitral tribunal when allegations of corruption, as a transnational public
policy consideration, are raised. The study believes that the Court reversed fundamental
legal principles of the national law, and maneuvered the concept of transnational public
policy to produce a plausible, yet not sound conclusion in the realm of both the national
judicial system and international arbitration. Further, this paper suggests that the court’s
attempt to safeguarding the Country’s public wealth actually jeopardized justice, the
state’s economy, and its investment credibility.
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I.

Introduction

Transition to market economy was pursued by the pre-2011 regime starting from the
1990s, this aim was sought through a structural adjustment program that targeted the
liberalization of the market, privatization of public-owned enterprises, and attracting
direct foreign investments.1 This radical reform required legislative and judicial
structural reform as to substantiate the investment environment, and to mitigate
investors’ worries about the security of their ownership rights.2
Legislative restructure could be referred to by enacting new laws aimed at
guaranteeing and protecting investments from expropriation and nationalization, and
providing accessible different disputes settlement mechanisms. This attempt can be
best represented by law no. 8/1997.3 Furthermore, on the judicial level there
was discernible autonomous granted to the Supreme Constitutional Court with regard
to the power of judicial review as a way to provide credible commitment to
investment protection.4
Applying the policy of privatization led to transferring of many industrial and
commercial entities’ ownership from governmental-affiliates to national and foreign
investors. Meanwhile, this policy triggered strong criticism, especially with regard to
criteria of evaluating the privatized assets financially. It usually have been stigmatized
as corrupt.
However, these critiques were retained beyond the judicial purview. As per
usual, contracts concluded in accordance with privatization included arbitration
clauses which enabled the parties to avoid resorting to domestic courts. This

1

Khalid Ikram. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMS IN EGYPT: ISSUES AND POLICYMAKING
SINCE 1952. The American University in Cairo press. 202, (2018).

2

Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 13,
285, (2014).
3

Law no. 8/1997 on Guarantees and Incentives of Investment, been Published on 11 May 1997, and was cancelled
recently by the Law no. 72/2017.

4

Moustafa, supra note 2, at 285.

1

mechanism of settling disputes was also available through other instruments,
including the investment law.5
It was until 2011 when Egypt witnessed radical political movements that
caused a whole collapse of the regime. Suddenly, a common tendency was expressed
to question and to adjudicate all the previous regime’s practices that were exercised
for 30 years. This tendency was manifested in media as well as in courts.
As a result, there were a number of lawsuits initiated by Egyptian activists,
and welcomed by privatization opponents before the State Council’s administrative
Court,6 requesting the annulment of the sale contracts of privatized entities.7
Surprisingly, the Court issued a number of identical judgments which, inter alia,
rendered these contracts of privatized enterprises null and void.
In fact, the Court reversed fundamental principles of civil procedural law,
administrative law, criminal law, and arbitration law, in addition to the inherent rules
of international arbitration. In addition, it intensely exaggerated the significance and
the national value of the privatized enterprises, and expressed its dissatisfaction with
the methods employed to dispose it. In effect, it affirmatively argued that there was
strong suspicions of the existence of corruption in concluding the privatization
contracts, so it charged senior public officials, as well as the investors who bought the
privatized enterprises, of being corrupt.
Inferring that these decisions contradict intrinsic legal principles, the Court
defensively warranted its conclusions, so it used emotional and patriotic statements to
decide on uncontested subject matters in these cases. Indeed, one of the most crucial
5

Law no. 8/1997, supra note 3. Article 7 reads as follows: “Investment disputes in respect of the implementation
of the provisions of this law shall be settled in a manner to be agreed upon with the investor or within the
framework of the agreements in force between [Egypt] and the investor’s home country, or within the framework
of the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between the State and the nationals of other countries
to which Egypt has adhered by virtue of law no. 90 of 1971, where such Convention applies, or according to the
Arbitration law no. 27/ 1994, or by arbitration before the Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial
Arbitration.”

6

The State Council is an independent judicial body. According to article 140 of the 2014 Constitution it is
exclusively competent to adjudicate in administrative disputes, disciplinary cases and appeals, and disputes
pertaining to its decisions. It is also solely competent to issue opinions on the legal issues of bodies to be
determined by law, review and draft bills and resolutions of a legislative character, and review draft contracts to
which the state or any public entity is a party. Other competencies are to be determined by law.

7

Reference here is made to the investment circuit of the Administration Court to which all the decisions
mentioned in this thesis are attributed. (hereinafter the Court)
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areas in these decisions was the declaration that all the investors to whom the
privatized entities have been sold have no right to resort to international arbitration.
The Court contented that due to the blatant breach of law and regulations these
contested contracts were definitely concluded in corrupt methods. It further purported
that corruption is a severe consideration that does not entail protection under the
auspice of International Arbitration.
This thesis analyzes case law in an area that is confused, and in conflict with
the constituent principles of Egyptian law and international arbitration. It studies the
legal basis of the Court’s conclusion in a series of identical decisions, in which it
found that sale contracts of privatized companies were null, void, and were concluded
corruptly. Next, it investigates the Court’s argument in respect of the inadmissibility
of potential claims of the investors whose investments were expropriated as a result of
its judgments before the ICSID arbitration due to the said corruption.
The thesis claims that the Court’s conclusion contradicts the most constituent
legal principles of the Egyptian criminal law, civil law, and arbitration law. Also, it
criticizes the Court’s exploiting of the concept of “transnational public policy” to
reveal the fallacy of its understanding to what constitutes corruption in light of
international arbitration practices.
This article believes that the Court was motivated by patriotic inspirations that
synchronized with the political circumstances which preceded its judgments. Thus, it
reacted in accordance with, and under the influence of the then historical and societal
context to protect the nation’s public wealth. It proposes that the Court intervened to
tackle the flagrant breach of law that reigned over the sale contracts of privatized
enterprises, and to encounter its odd results. Nevertheless, this paper explains that the
Court’s attempt led to delivering poor judgments that, in fact, were inconsistent with
law to the same extent.
It eventually emphasizes that the Court’s position did not achieve what it
aspired, on the contrary, it demolished the purpose of the Egyptian legislative’s aim to
protect investment from expropriation, so it jeopardized Egypt’s economy and
investment credibility. In effect, it illustrates that the Court’s activism was done at the
expense of justice.
3

This thesis criticizes the Court’s stance because its decisions are in conflict
with domestic laws, so it does not suggest that the contested contracts were concluded
in accordance with law. It also does not suggest that the judgments are wrong because
the international arbitration’s criteria are correct. It rather criticizes the Court’s
rationale because it argued that it applies these practical standards and criteria, but in
fact, it maneuvered these concepts to fit in its conclusion.
In addition, the thesis does not target to analyze all the procedural and
substantive matters of the Court’s decisions. It focuses only on areas where the Court
placed itself in the position of the national criminal and civil judges on the one hand,
and of the international arbitrators on the other, to decide upon their competence and
jurisdiction, and on behalf of them. However, as the Court’s rationale was widely
criticized for other legal irregularities it produced, yet, only certain issues will be
addressed to the extent that serves to connecting the dots between the Court’s legal
rationale and its conclusion, but will not be exhaustively examined.
For this purpose, two main models will be demonstrated. The first model is the
lawsuit no. 11492/ 65 which became publicly known as “Omar Effendi case”.8 The
second model is the arbitral award in the ICSID case no. ARB/ 14/ 4 which was
initiated by a foreign investor against Egypt for requesting damages due to Egypt’s
violation of its obligations under a Bilateral Investment Treaty.9
The relevance of these two models stems from two main facts. First, the Omar
Effendi decision is the first paradigm that was imitated in a series of subsequent
identical decisions rendered by the same Court. In fact, its rationale and perception of
corruption was adopted and cited by Egypt’s defense in Union Fenosa as to prove the
alleged corruption in procuring the contested contract. Second, the Tribunal’s process
of analyzing the adduced evidence in Union Fenosa signifies how corruption in

8 The case No. 11492/ 65 was initiated on 21-12-2010 before the investment circuit of Cairo Administrative Court
at State Council by an Egyptian activist called Hamdi Al-Fakharani. (hereinafter Omar Effendi). Though it is
beyond the purpose of this study to furnish an exhaustive detailed legal commentary on all the procedural and
substantive issues raised in each model, yet, a brief overview of their facts and most crucial legal issues will be
presented in chapter one.
9

UNIÓN FENOSA GAS, S.A. ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT ICSID Case No. ARB/14/4. Final Award on 31-82018. Available at: https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10061.pdf. Last accessed 243-2021. (hereinafter Union Fenosa)
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investment contracts is administered in international arbitration practice by refuting
the Court’s rationale in the Omar Effendi decision.10
This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter demonstrates the
two main models under examination, their key facts, allegation of corruption, and
how the Court and the Tribunal dealt with such an allegation.
Chapter two studies the national legal basis of the Omar Effendi decision. This
process aims at analyzing the legal and factual considerations through which the
Court decided that the contested contract was concluded corruptly. This chapter
serves to enumerate the legal faults that the Court made at the expense of the wellestablished legal principles of the Egyptian law. It then links this stance with
employing a non-pure legal analysis to decide on other uncontested subject matters,
which is the inadmissibility of contracts of corruption before the ICSID arbitration in
light of the concept of transnational public policy.
Chapter three presents the concept of transnational public policy. This
explanation serves to understand what constitutes corruption in the realm of
international arbitration in public procurement contracts, and why it became widely
perceived as transnational public policy. Next, this chapter shows how corruption is
administered in international commercial arbitration and in ICSID arbitration. It
further manifests the arbitrators’ attitudes towards corruption, and their evidence
gathering and evaluating process.
The last chapter is devoted to assessing the Omar Effendi decision. It
comprehensively compares between the Court’s and the Tribunal’s rationale as with
regard to the administration of corruption in investment contracts, this comparison
also extends to include two other relevant ICISD cases. The assessment further
continues to evaluate the Court’s argument with regard to safeguarding the nation’s

10 It is critical to refer here that the major limitation with the award of Union Fenosa was the unavailability of
some information and facts of the case due to confidentiality, the Tribunal recorded that “the Respondent
requested that the Claimant withdraw from the record certain document filed with the Claimant’s Rejoinder
Memorial on Jurisdiction and Admissibility… The Respondent argued that these documents constituted
confidential state secrets not subject to disclosure under Egyptian law.” Id, at 8, part 1, para. 1.50

5

public wealth on the one hand, and the results of this decision on the State’s economy
and individuals’ rights and interests on the other.
It eventually purports that the Court failed to achieve what it aspired. Its activism led
to delivering a poor judgment that is inconsistent with law, affected the economy
negatively, jeopardized the Country’s investment credibility, and conflicted the
legislature’s aim. It proposes that the Court would have produced less-harmful
outcomes if it has been applied the law properly.

6

II.

Omar Effendi and Union Fenosa: Raising the Question of Corruption

This chapter presents two models of analysis to the issue of corruption as a
transnational public policy consideration in international investment contracts. These
models illustrate the different outcomes that both the Egyptian State Council and the
ICSID arbitration reached with regard to the perception of obtaining contracts of
corruption.
The first model concerns a lawsuit brought by an Egyptian activist against a
Saudi investor and other public officials concerning the Omar Effendi Company for
the annulment and cancellation of the Company’s sale contract concluded between the
investor and an Egyptian governmental affiliate.11 The second model concerns an
ICSID arbitration case initiated by a Spanish investor against Egypt concerning the
Claimant’s investment in Egypt (gas liquefaction plant) for requesting damages
resulted from unlawful measurements that resulted in the plant’s complete shutdown.12
A. Omar Effendi Lawsuit
The Omar Effendi lawsuit is one of several cases concerning the annulment of
privatization contracts; yet, the Court’s decision in Omar Effendi is the first one that
affirmatively declaring that contracts of sold privatized corporations were concluded
corruptly.
On December 21st, 2010, Omar Effendi lawsuit no. 11492/ 65 was filed by the
claimant before the Court, petitioning for the cancellation and the annulment of the
sale contract of the Omar Effendi Company.
The claimant argued that the government had approved the sale of the
company to a foreign investor in flagrant violation of the bidding law, and for a much
lower price than the real value. In addition, the buyer had breached fundamental
contractual obligations, such as unfairly dismissing workers.

11

Omar Effendi, supra note 8.

12

UNIÓN FENOSA, supra note 9.
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On May 5th, 2011 the Court delivered its verdict, inter alia. It annulled the
contract, cancelled the related governmental orders and procedures, and set aside the
arbitration clause included therein.
1. Factual Background
An understanding of the company’s history and how it led to this outcome illustrates
its historical and economic heritage value. The Omar Effendi Company is one of the
oldest and largest Egyptian giant department stores. Its popularity amongst Egyptians
is due to its long history as the first chain retail store with 82 branches all over the
country.13
It was originally established under the name of “Orosdi Back” in the middle of
the nineteenth century by a family with an Austrian-origin family. In 1921 it gained
its current commercial name “Omar Effendi” after ownership was transferred to
another Jewish-Egyptian merchant.
By 1957, the company was nationalized along with many other foreign and
Egyptian-owned companies. In 1967, Omar Effendi became an Egyptian publicly
company owned as a government affiliate.14 Its ownership was later shifted to the
Holding Company for Building and Construction, and finally to the National
Company for Building and Construction (hereinafter NCBC).
By the 1990s, Omar Effendi’s condition had changed again. The
nationalization of the company, similar to other entities, did not lead to any
accomplishment. Its iconic status in the first half of the last century dissipated under
poor management becoming a burden on the State’s economy.
As a result of the failure of managing and operating publicly-owned
corporations, the government decided to change its economic policies with regard to
the entities it owned, and the policy of laissez faire was adopted. Upon the
implementation of this new paradigm, the succeeding Egyptian governments started
to privatize various categories of companies that were owned by their affiliates. In the
13

Omar Effendi, supra note 8. https://omareffendi.com.eg/?lang=en&module=page&param1=history. Last
accessed 1 March 2021.
14

Republican Decree no. 544/ 1967, been published on 18 February 1967.
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case of Omar Effendi, the Ministerial Committee for Privatization announced on 1
January 2001 its decision to sell 90% of the company’s shares.15 The decision was
approved by the Cabinet on 6 January 2004.
On 11 November 2005, the NCBC announced the terms of the sale and the
procedures of the transaction, and on 4 April 2006, one sole offer was made by a
foreign investor for 90% of the company. After the approval of the Committee and the
Cabinet, on 2 November 2006, the sale contract of 90% of the Omar Effendi
Company was concluded between the NCBC and the foreign investor.
Two incidents had been occurred before this lawsuit has been filed, and should
be mentioned before stepping forward, as each of them has its impact on the propriety
of the Omar Effendi decision. First, during the process of evaluating the company’s
assets before the sale, the Public Prosecution had investigated a complaint raised by
one of the parties to the lawsuit, alleging potential criminal acts with regard to the
evaluation process. The Public Prosecution ultimately decided that there was no
dissipation of the public wealth, and the case was closed on 21 March 2006.16 This
decision was affirmative in negating the criminal activity in conducting the evaluation
process of the company.
Second, after concluding the now-contested contract, the buyer filed case no.
583/ 2008 before the Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration
(CRCICA) to seek an annulment of the contract on the basis of the breach of the
seller’s contractual obligations. The arbitral tribunal delivered its award on 10
November 2010 and rejected the plaintiff’s claims.
2. The Court’s Rationale

15 On 20 August 2000, the then-prime minister issued decree no. 1765/ 2000, been published on 30 August 2000,
that established the Ministerial Committee for Privatization (hereinafter the Committee). The Committee was
constituted of 19 ministers in addition to the Central Bank chief. It was generally entitled to study all the related
matters with regard to the process of privatization, including determining which assets and companies to be
privatized, and the value of each transaction. The recommendations of the Committee were to be raised to the
Cabinet monthly.
16 Omar Effendi, supra note 8, the investigation of the Egyptian Public Prosecution no. 18/ 2006, filed on 5 March
2006.
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On May 5th, 2011 the Court concluded that the contract under examination was null
and void. This conclusion was reached according to the following findings:
First, the Court approved the plaintiffs’ capacity to initiate the lawsuit as
Egyptian citizens, as they were constitutionally entitled to resort to the state’s
judiciary to examine the legitimacy of the sale of the state’s public properties.17
Second, the Court affirmed its competence to judicially review the contract’s
legitimacy. It referred to the administrative nature of the contract that was concluded
upon the fulfillment of the governmental approvals.18 It follows that the Court raised,
ex officio, the annulment of the arbitration clause included therein on the basis of the
prerequisite of article 1 (2) of the Egyptian Arbitration law.19 Having regarded this
prerequisite as a public policy consideration, the court rendered the arbitration clause
null and void.
Third, and most importantly, the court enumerated severe violations to the
law, regulations, and the requirements of the policies designated for the
implementation of privatizing the company. The violations were based on three major
grounds.
The first posited that the entire evaluation process of the company’s assets had
been intentionally manipulated. This involved the provision of misleading financial
figures that drastically degraded the real value of the company.
The second asserted that other assets, including real estate properties and
entitlements, were excluded from this erroneous evaluation process, as they were
simply not offered in the transaction as per the decision of the Committee. However,
17 Based upon article 6 of the then-Constitutional declaration, that mirrors article 33 of the 1971 Constitution,
which authorized all citizens to support and protect the public wealth.
18
The Court interpreted the plaintiffs’ requests as to the cancellation of the Committee’s decision dated September
25th, 2006 that approved the recommendation of the sale of 90% of the Company and all its related consequences
which involve the sale Contract between NCBC –as a deputy to the ministry of investment- and the foreign buyer.
The Court further explains that the sale occurred due to the delegation of the competent governmental body.
Accordingly, all the approvals and the sale contracts are in fact administrative decisions subject to the Court’s
competency.
19 This sub-article reads as follows: “With regard to disputes relating to administrative contracts, agreement on
arbitration shall be reached with the approval of the competent minister or the official assuming his powers with
respect to public law entities. No delegation of powers shall be authorized therefrom.”
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the contract of sale included all these assets and entitlements. In other words, it was
given to the buyer for free.
Finally, in order to accomplish the transaction at any cost, the Committee
accepted the sole and remarkably low offer by the buyer. Accepting an offer that was
presented had no competitors,20 and strikingly less than that “falsely” determined was
a flagrant violation to law, regulations, and the stipulated criteria to privatize the
company.
3. Raising the Question of Corruption
The findings in Omar Effendi were a judicial review not only of the legitimacy of a
contested contract, but also the legitimacy of all other contracts concluded in
accordance with privatization policy.
More specifically, the decision in Omar Effendi was not one-of-a-kind.
Indeed, this judgment was one of a series of similar decisions that targeted the
annulment of numerous similar contracts.
For instance, a few days after the decision of Omar Effendi had been rendered,
another lawsuit was filed before the same Court which related to the sales contract of
the Tanta Linen Company.21 On September 21st, 2011 the Court delivered its verdict.
It, inter alia, annulled the sale contract, and set aside the arbitration clause included
therein. On the same day, the same Court gave the exact same conclusion on a third
lawsuit annulling the sale contract of the Misr Shibin El Kom Textile Company.22
These lawsuits are only a sample of similar cases which share common
characteristics.23 First, the claimant is an Egyptian citizen who is not a party to the

20

Article 15 of law no. 89/ 1998 that governs bids sets out that the bid may be cancelled if a sole offer is presented
even if fulfilled the transactions’ requirements. Also, article 127 of the executive memorandum exceptionally
grants the authority to accept the sole presented offer if only it is in conformity with the transaction’s conditions.
21 lawsuit no. 34248 of the judicial year 65, (hereinafter Tanta linen). It had been filed on 21 May 2011 and
brought before the same circuit.
22

lawsuit No. 34517 of the Judicial year 65, (hereinafter Misr Shibin Textile). It was initiated before the first
instant of the administrative court at Monufia Governorate on September 26th, 2010, which decided to submit it to
the Investment Circuit at the Administrative Court at Cairo.

23 This list extends to include lawsuit no. 37542 of the judicial year 65 concerning the Nile for Cotton paring
Company, the Court delivered its decision on 17 December 2011, and the lawsuit no. 40510 of the judicial year 65
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contract under question and may not even have a legal relationship with the sold
entity. Second, the respondents are ex-public officials whose approvals were the basis
of the contested contract, in addition to the buyer, who is in most cases a foreign
investor. Finally, all of the cases involved a formerly government-approved contract.
Just as the case is in the Omar Effendi decision, the Court highlighted the
corruption that encompassed the entire transaction. Thus, it broadly explained how
corrupt the practices were, how flagrantly the law had been breached, and how the
state’s wealth had been dissipated.
For example, the Court affirmed that the process by which the company’s
value had been estimated was tremendously deceptive, based on no legal or factual
grounds, and led to an assault on the public wealth. It also criticized the complacency
shown in the transaction’s terms and conditions as well as the provisions of the
contract. It further explained that the government conducted the privatization of the
enterprise as if it was an abomination that had to be purified.
4. Consequences of suspicions
Based on these assumptions and suspicions, the Court charged the investor of being
an integral part of this corruption. Surprisingly, it went even further by declaring ex
officio that this investor was not entitled to resort to international arbitration under the
realm of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
National of other States (hereinafter Convention).
This conclusion is constituted on two bases. First, the Court argued that the
contested contract did not refer to submitting its parties’ disputes to the arbitration
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter
ICSID).24 Second, the Court asserted that this corrupt investor has no right to resort to
the ICSID arbitration. It cites the principle in World Duty Free Limited vs. The
Republic of Kenya (hereinafter WDF vs. Kenya) whereby “claims based on contracts

concerning Elnasr for steam Boilers Manufacturing Company, the Court delivered its decision on 21 September
2011.
24

ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules. Washington, D.C.: International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 2003. Available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf.
Last accessed on 25 March 2021.
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of corruption or on contracts obtained by corruption cannot be upheld by this Arbitral
Tribunal.”25
B. Union Fenosa Gas vs. Arab Republic of Egypt
The Tribunal’s award in Union Fenosa mirrors how the allegation of corruption in
obtaining contracts of investment is analyzed and administered in the ICSID
arbitration. This award highlights the process of analyzing the adduced evidence and
its relevance to prove the allegation of corruption.
This ICSID case no. ARB/14/4 was filed by a Spanish investor (hereinafter
Claimant) against the host state (hereinafter Egypt) for requesting damages due to
Egypt’s failure to afford the protections granted to the Claimant’s investment by the
Bilateral Investment Treaty (hereinafter BIT).26
This dispute arose under the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Spain and
Egypt, in which the Claimant’s investments allegedly had been influenced due to the
host state’s acts and omissions that breached its substantive obligations under the
Treaty. The investor initiated the claim before the ICSID arbitration. The arbitral
Tribunal held that Egypt has violated its obligations under the Fair and Equitable
Treatment standard according to the Treaty, rendering it liable to the Claimant, and
imposing a sum of US$ 2.013.071.000 as compensation.
1. Factual Background.
A brief introductory to the context through which the dispute arose helps to
understand the relationship between the parties. On November 3rd, 1992 the Kingdom
of Spain and the Arab Republic of Egypt signed the agreement on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of Spain and Egypt
(hereinafter the Treaty), and it entered into force on April 26th, 1994.

25 World Duty Free Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case no. ARB/00/7. 4 October 2006. Final
Award. (hereinafter WDF vs. Kenya).
26

UNIÓN FENOSA, supra note 9.
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Under its realm, the Sale and Purchase agreement (hereinafter SPA) dated
August 1st, 2000 between a Spanish enterprise, later assigned to the Claimant as a
buyer, and an Egyptian corporation as a seller. The Claimant’s investment in Egypt
related to the Damietta natural gas liquefaction plant, concerning the liquefaction,
shipping, regasification, and commercialization of natural gas.
The dispute arose as a result of Egypt’s failure to afford the protections
granted by the Treaty. The Claimant’s main ground was that its investments had
suffered and had continued to suffer significant harm as a result of decisions
attributable to Egypt to curtail and cut the supply of natural gas to the plant, which
eventually resulted in a complete shut-down for lack of a gas supply. According to the
Treaty, Egypt’s obligations generally include the protection of the Claimant’s
investments against unjustified or discriminatory measures. The Treaty also grants the
Claimant the right to resort to one of several means of dispute settlement mechanisms,
including the ICSID.
2. The Question of Corruption
In an attempt to challenge the arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction, Egypt contended that
the Claimant’s investment was not protected under the Treaty and the ICSID
Convention due to the existence of corruption. An investment made corruptly does
not qualify for protection under the laws of Egypt, and under the Treaty as a matter of
international law.
Stressing the wording of the treaty with regard to conducting investments in
compliance with Egyptian law, Egypt argued that the Claimant’s investments were
procured through corrupt and illegal practices to which the Claimant was a party.
Egypt constituted its claim upon three separate acts of corrupt conduct, all of which
were attributed to the Claimant and its associated companies.
First, the selection of the subcontractor to build the plant was a process that
was riddled with corruption. The Engineering, Procurement, and Construction
contract (EPC contract) was awarded to a joint venture consortium led by a company
whose bid was 50,000,000 USD higher than its nearest competitor. The winning
company’s CEO later pleaded guilty in the USA to violations of the US Foreign
14

Corrupt Practices Act for bribing Egyptian Government officials in connection with
an “unnamed Egypt liquefied natural gas project.”27
The second act of corruption involved the Claimant’s engaging of a friend of
then-President of Egypt Hosny Mubarak who publicly stated that he had used his
personal connections in the government for the Claimant’s benefit.
The third, and most important act, concerning the Claimant’s engaging an
Egyptian businessman who had genuine connections with the then-Minister of
Petroleum. The Claimant hired him as an “agent” or “intermediary” to use his illicit
influence on the then-Minister to steer the Damietta project towards the Claimant.
Egypt contended that the project was awarded to the Claimant upon the
intermediary’s influence without a tender process. According to Egyptian law,
obtaining such a project has to be done through an open and competitive bid process,
however, it was unilaterally approved by the then-Minister. Egypt, on this particular
point, cited the Omar Effendi decision.
Furthermore, Egypt argued that the Claimant’s association with this
intermediary was not a true business partnership. The latter’s contribution to the
project was a total of 6.88 million USD which was later sold to the Claimant’s
associated company, a contribution that was nothing more than money funneled to
him in exchange for his personal connections and back-channel influence. All three of
these acts reflected corruption on the part of the Claimant whose business and
contract was obtained corruptly, therefore, does not qualify protection according to
international public policy.
3. The Arbitral Tribunal’s Rationale
The Tribunal’s rationale is characterized by closely scrutinizing the adduced evidence
individually and collectively. Its starting-point emphasized the general principle that
investment made corruptly by the investor does not qualify for protection as a matter
of international public policy, of Egypt’s law, and of the Treaty.

27

Id. At time, there was only another project in Egypt, to which that company had no involvement.
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In addition, the Tribunal asserted that Egypt bears the legal burden and
standard of proof for its allegations of corruption. Beyond that, as corruption is rarely
proven by direct convincing evidence, the Tribunal believed that the standard of proof
remains “the balance of probabilities” that depends upon an accumulation of
circumstantial evidence.
The Tribunal first addressed the allegation of corruption related to the
awarding of the EPC contract. The Tribunal, assuming that the CEO’s conviction in
the US did indeed relate to the Damietta Project, found no “evidential materials” that
linked the Claimant per se with such acts of corruption attributed to the CEO.
The Tribunal, next, adopted the same attitude as it had concerning the
allegation of the intervention of the close ‘confidant’ of the then-President of Egypt in
the project. It found that Egypt presented no proof that the Claimant was involved in
the negotiations of the SPA through him.
Finally, the Tribunal examined the most crucial allegation of corruption raised
by Egypt. It related to the role of the Egyptian businessman, as allegedly being an
intermediary, and whose influence on the corrupted public officials led to the granting
of the project to the Claimants’ associations
The Tribunal acknowledged at the outset that this businessman, along with the
then-Minister of Petroleum, at the time of the proceedings, was under investigation by
the Egyptian public prosecution in connection with the corruption surrounding the
Damietta project.28
In addition, it also realized that he, as well as his family-owned company
which was also connected to the preliminary business of the project, had very limited
experience in the field of this complex project. This limited experience cannot
plausibly explain the Claimant’s choice of him as a local partner for the project.
Moreover, the Tribunal noted that several payments received by this Egyptian

28 On 27 October 2016, the Court of Cassation found the ex-Minister, and other public officials involved in the
case, not guilty. Case No. 2487 of judicial year 86. Available at https://manshurat.org/node/30848. Last accessed
26 March 2021. The said businessman was not involved in this case, yet, he was convicted of credit fraud and
sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. https://www.masrawy.com/news/news_egypt/details/2012/4/28/121284
Last accessed 26 March 2021.
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partner’s company seemed overly generous. Above all, the Tribunal believed that this
partner was not a net source of capital for the project, nor did he provide any funding.
Acknowledging all these facts, the Tribunal viewed this businessman’s role in
the project visibly from the outset. His involvement with the Claimant in the project
was publicly identified for the Egyptian decision-makers. In the Tribunal’s view, this
partner was chosen to act as a lobbyist with access to Egypt’s decision-makers:
Access to government power can be a valuable asset to bring to a
project involving the purchase of natural resources from the State
or State entity, particularly when such natural resources comprise
highly regulated sectors of the economy controlled by the State.
Different States have a variety of standards governing the propriety
of taking advantage of such access; lobbying can take many forms;
and a paid lobbyist is not necessarily committing a crime or other
impropriety.29
Hence, the determinant question is whether this partner was only
acting as a lobbyist with access to the Egyptian decision-makers. The Tribunal
found, upon the evidence adduced, that he did not act as a covert peddler of
influence; it found no evidence of any back-channel influence. In other words,
corruption is not established since there was no proof of any monies received
by a senior decision-maker through this partner nor bribe paid or promises
made. In light of the fact that neither this partner, nor any of the public
officials had been prosecuted by the Egyptian judiciary for criminal conduct
in regard to the project, the allegation of corruption could not be accepted.
Moreover, the Tribunal points out that concluding the contract in
contradiction of the national procedures as regards a public bid cannot be
taken as proof of corruption. In fact, the contract had been ratified and even
amended several times after its first conclusion and approved by the Egyptian
Cabinet without raising the issue of incompatibility with Egypt’s law.
The Tribunal finally argued that the allegation of corruption on the
part of the Egyptian partner was not frivolous, but, the evidential

29

Union Fenosa, supra note 9, Para 7.101.
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circumstances made by Egypt did not suffice without proof. The Tribunal
asserted that:
Suspicion is not equivalent to proof. Unanswered queries may
have innocent explanations, not amounting (in the absence of
explanations) to proof of corruption. With hindsight, what
business people agree not infrequently defies logic or commonsense to non-business people, again without amounting to proof of
corruption. The legal burden of proving corruption rests upon the
party alleging corruption; and it is not discharged by placing the
burden on the adverse party to prove the absence of corruption.30
Thus, the Tribunal found that upon the insufficient evidence of corruption against
the Claimant, the Respondent’s allegation of corruption was dismissed.
C. Concluding Remarks
The demonstration of the abovementioned two models reveals a
number of facts. While a comprehensive comparison between the Court and
the Tribunal’s position with regard to the administration of the issue of
corruption in investment contracts will be held in the fourth chapter, yet,
enumerating these facts serves to point out areas of examination.
First, On the one hand, the Court believed that privatization of
publicly-owned entities led to the dissipation of the State’s wealth, so it
invoked ex officio issues of corruption and inadmissibility before the ICSID to
substantiate its position that targeted retaining the sold assets. On the other
hand, the Tribunal in Union Fenosa only dealt with the challenges invoked
before it and in light of the case presented.
Second, The Court viewed that violation of national laws and
regulations encompassed the sale contract as evidence of collusive corruption
committed by the public officials and the foreign investor. On the contrary,
the Tribunal in Union Fenosa rejected the allegation of corruption after many
local official approvals had been obtained for the contested contract over more
than ten years.

30

Id. Para 7.113.
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Likewise, The Court insisted on accusing public officials of being
corrupt due to its own belief in their criminal liability. This standpoint ignored
the results of previous criminal investigations which ended without charges.
But the Tribunal found the allegation of corruption as not legally plausible
since the Egyptian authorities did not charge the alleged intermediary or any
other public official of being corrupt in relation to a matter that was directly
related to the project.
Chapter two will address the domestic legal basis through which the Court in Omar
Effendi reached its conclusion with regard to the nullity of the contested sale contract
due to flagrant breach of law, public officials’ criminal liability, and the
inapplicability of the arbitration clause.
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III.

The Legal Basis of Omar Effendi

The Court in Omar Effendi found the sale contract of the enterprise to be corrupt, and
accordingly rendered it null and void. In order to reach this conclusion the Court had
to address several procedural and substantive matters.
In its efforts to deal with the legal irregularities that led to that contract, the
Court made several legal faults in its analysis.
I argue that the Court reversed numerous well-established principles of the
Egyptian legal system and its domestic public policy considerations, as well as
longstanding Egyptian judicial precedents. I further connect this methodology with
the mechanism that the Court adopted to defend its stance and to decide upon
unchallenged subject matters in the case.
The first part of this chapter begins with questioning the capacity of the
claimant to file this case before State Council. Second, it discusses the competency of
the Court to review the sale contract of Omar Effendi including the legal rationale it
leveraged in treating it as an administrative contract. Third, it addresses the severe
public policy violation of an administrative court assuming criminal activity on behalf
of the competent criminal court, and in contradiction with a previous order issued
from the public prosecution. Fourth, this part investigates another public policy
consideration concerning the issue of res judicata, as this decision contradicts a
previous arbitral award rendered in accordance with the arbitration clause included in
the contested sale contract.
The second part links the Court’s legal analysis of the contested issues to its
normative non legal analysis to uncontested issues that it invoked ex officio.
20

A.

The Court’s Legal Analysis

The Court in Omar Effendi, as well as in identical subsequent decisions, had to
overcome procedural and substantive legal obstacles in order to decide on the subject
matter. Accordingly, in order to render the sale contract null and void it first had to
justify the capacity of the claimants to file this lawsuit, even though they were not
parties to the contract in question.
Next, it had to approve its jurisdiction and competency to judicially review the
contested contract. The Court then had to deal with the principle of Separability of
arbitration clause, as the sale contract included an arbitration clause. Indeed, this
arbitration clause was employed in a previous conflict which arose between parties to
the sale contract where the competent arbitral tribunal rendered its award; thus, the
Court had to deal with the issue of res judicata.
1.

The Legal Capacity of the Plaintiff.

One of the most fundamental rules of civil and administrative lawsuits is that
plaintiffs must have a legal capacity to initiate their claims before courts. This rule is
found in article 3 of the Egyptian Civil and Commercial Procedural Law which limits
the right to initiate a lawsuit before the judiciary to plaintiffs who have a personal,
direct, and existing interest according to the law.31 The rule gives courts absolute
discretion to dismiss claims initiated by individuals who lack this capacity as a public
policy consideration.32

31

Article 3 (1) of the Egyptian Civil and Commercial Procedural Law no. 13/ 1968.

32

Id. article 3 (3).
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This rule is reiterated in article 12 of the law no. 47/ 1972 which expressly
requires the personal interest of the plaintiff as a condition for the acceptance of their
claims.33 Accordingly, plaintiffs to an administrative lawsuit may be entitled to
exercise their right of litigation with respect to a given matter only when they have
direct and personal legal interest in that matter.34 In addition, being personal means
that the claimant’s personal interest must be seriously affected by the administrative
decision that they seek to challenge,35 so it is a vital requirement that the Court is
entitled to monitor its existence at the outset of the hearings until it renders its
decision.36
But the Court reversed this inherent rule and approved the claimant’s capacity
to initiate lawsuits that targeted the annulment of administrative decisions that led to
the sale of privatized enterprises. It emphasized that the joinder of parties has the legal
capacity to initiate these lawsuits even if none of them was a party to the sale contract.
The Court explained that the plaintiff exercised a constitutional right to protect
public wealth. More specifically, it argued that each and every Egyptian citizen is
constitutionally obliged to defend public ownership, thus, requesting to investigate the
legality and legitimacy of sale contracts of these publicly-owned enterprises is an
obligation that makes those individuals entitled to initiate claims for requesting nullity
of such a contract.37

33

Law no. 47/ 1972 concerning the State Council was published on 5 October 1972. Article 12 (a) states that the
following claims must be denied: a) if the claimants have no personal interest.”

34
35

The Higher Administrative Court, Appeal no. 6637/ 50 was rendered on 28 April 2007.
The Higher Administrative Court, Appeal no. 9393/ 47 was rendered on 2 December 2006.

36

The Higher Administrative Court, Appeals no. 8133/ 51 was rendered on 2 April 2005 and no. 12915/ 52 was
rendered on 11 November 2006.
37

Omar Effendi, supra note 8.
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Furthermore, the Court illustrates that legal capacity in administrative claims
should not be strictly interpreted in light of the general rule of article 3 of the Civil
and Commercial Procedural law, because the former extends to encompass other
forms of interests that aim at guaranteeing the principle of legitimacy, which in turn
the cornerstone of civilized nations.38
In fact, the Court’s rationale in deciding on the Claimant’s legal capacity in
this series of lawsuits was not one-of-a-kind, as it cited an earlier ruling rendered by
the Higher Administrative Court that admits each Egyptian citizen’s right to question
the legitimacy of contracts related to the disposition of public wealth.39 However, this
precedent was widely criticized, and cannot be followed blindly, in fact, it does not
relate preciously to the claims.
As a case in point, admitting the initiation of these lawsuits from individuals in
their capacity as Egyptian citizens and with no time frame limitation must lead to
severe legal irregularities that will be explained in chapter four, such as abusing the
right of litigation, jeopardizing both investment environment and the national
economy. However, the precedent that the Court cited is irrelevant, as it relates to the
nature of the government’s decision to export one of the Country’s natural resources,
and whether it is an act of sovereignty that cannot be challenged by citizens or not.
This is not the case in Omar Effendi where the challenge relates to a commercial
transaction made in accordance with civil law.

38

Misr Shibin Textile, supra note 20.
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The Higher Administrative Court, Appeal no. 5546, 6013/ 55 on 27/ 2/ 2010: “Both Legal capacity and interest
merge in claims that requesting nullity. The legal characteristic of this kind of legitimacy-related lawsuit requires
broadening the definition of interest necessitated in other kinds of claims, so they are not strictly limited to a
claimant’s own personal legal right. Therefore, article 3 of the Egyptian Civil and Commercial Procedural Law is
inapplicable when contradicts the nature of claims requesting nullity. Accordingly, each Egyptian citizen has the
interest to initiate claims concerning the development and exploiting revenues of the country’s natural resources.”
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2. The Competency of the Court
The Court’s rationale with regard to its competency to decide on the subject matter of
Omar Effendi triggered even more critiques.
Certainly, any court has initially to examine whether the lawsuit in question is
able to be settled according to its legal jurisdiction. Because classifying Courts
according to their jurisdictions is constitutionally determined. Violation of this
classification must result in violating a domestic public policy consideration.
However, the Court violated this rule although it was quite clear that the
contract in question was subjected to the jurisdiction of civil courts according to the
constitution and concerned laws. Indeed, the Court presented poor legal reasoning in
order to affirm its jurisdiction.
The Court used a well-established legal rule which gives discretionary power
to courts to determine the proper legal basis of a case in question according to its
facts, so that it is not restricted by the parties’ determination,40 and that the
administrative judge controls administrative lawsuits positively through principles of
legitimacy and rule of law to extract the proper legal orientation.41
In Omar Effendi, as well as the following decisions, the claimants’ requests
were the cancellation of the decision that led to concluding the sale contract, and the
annulment of the contract. As previously mentioned, the decision was issued by the

40

The Court of Cassation, appeal no. 8583/ 66 on 15/ 4/ 1998.

41

The Higher Administrative Court, Appeal no. 4011/ 50 on 5/ 12/ 2006.
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Committee and approved by the Cabinet, then the NCBC concluded the sale contract
with the investor.42
The Court considered the decision of the Committee as an administrative
decree that is subjected to its judicial review, so it used its discretionary power to
reformulate the lawsuit’s subject matter as to suspend and then to cancel the decision
of the Committee dated 1/ 1/ 2001 to sell the shares of the Omar Effendi Company
and all the sequences resulted thereafter, especially the concluding of the sale
contract.
The Court distinguished between the procedures that precede the contract and
the concluding of the contract per se. It explained that these procedures were a pure
administrative order that was taken by the competent administrative authority, as
these procedures characterized the administration’s obligatory will that based upon its
public authority according to laws and regulations. Besides, it aimed at bringing about
a legal situation that targets public interests. Therefore, while these decisions are
preparatory steps for the contract, yet, they have separate characteristics and are
subject to an administrative judicial review.43
Next, the Court turned to the real legal dilemma which is the legal nature of
the contested contract. The sale contract was concluded between the NCBC and the
foreign investor purely in accordance with law no. 159/ 1981.44 Disputes arising out
of implementing this law are a sole jurisdiction of the competent civil courts.

42

The Committee, supra note 15.

43

Omar Effendi, supra note 8. The Court followed the same rationale in both Tanta Lined and Misr Shibin
Textile, and it cited the Higher Administrative Court, Appeal no. 666/ 24 on 14/ 4/ 1979.
44 Law no. 159/ 1981 concerning the issuance of Shareholder, share limited, limited liability, and one-person
companies, published on 1 October 1981.
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Hence, in order to extend its jurisdiction over this contract, the Court went
through a complex legal analysis of the procedural process of privatization policy as
administered in Egypt. It enumerates the features that distinguish administrative
contracts, as it must be concluded by an entity that represents the State, acts on its
behalf, and appears to use its authority for implementing its role in achieving public
interest. Moreover, this contracting body must declare that it applies the public law’s
contractual methods that are not familiar nor practical in private law contracts.45
Next, the Court went to analyze the provisions of the sale contract in a really
unreliable manner to extract what indicates that it is an administrative, not civil
contract. Eventually, it concludes that because selling a publicly-owned enterprise
could only be done by following these governmental procedures that define its criteria
and approvals, so the sale contract of any privatized enterprise must be characterized
as being an administrative contract, which in turn is also subjected to its
administrative judicial review.
In particular, it alleges that the concluding of the sale contract was a result of
designated governmental approvals issued from the Committee. And, because the
NCBC, though a private law entity according to law no. 203/ 1991,46 has no power to
enter into such a legal contractual relationship upon its own initiation so that NCBC’s
legal acts should not be viewed as a contractual relationship of a private law entity.
Rather, being a tool to implement the government’s economic plans with regard to
privatization made the NCBC a representative of the government, acted on its behalf,

45

Omar Effendi, supra note 8.
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Law no. 203/ 1991 concerning the issuance of Public Business Sector, published on 19 July 1991. The
preliminary article states that: “Public business sector shall be governed by this law, this sector composites of
holding companies and its affiliates subjected to the provisions of this law, it shall all take the scheme of
shareholder companies, and shall be governed by the provisions of the law of companies no. 159/ 1981”.

26

and upon its delegation to sell the company. Therefore, the contract itself is
considered to be an administrative contract that can be challenged before
administrative courts.
Apparently, the Court’s rationale violated the explicit provisions of law no.
203/ 1991 which classifies the holding companies as shareholder companies that have
their own legal identity, are considered as private law bodies, and are governed by law
no. 159/ 1981.47 Being a tool that implements governmental policies does not legally
change its nature or turns its contractual relationships into administrative contracts
that can be challenged before State Council, it remains a private law entity that is
governed by the law of companies and under the legal jurisdiction of the civil courts.
The Court apparently muddled up the functions of the holding companies in
implementing privatization policy and its legal characteristics as designated by law.
So it turned it from a contractual relationship accomplished between two parties who
belong to private law into an administrative one that can be challenged before
administrative courts.
Furthermore, the Court had to follow the same manner in relation to the legal
nature of the State’s private ownership and its public ownership. It wrongly kept
referring to the properties of the holding companies as public ownership. Such a
standpoint was contrary to article 12 of law no. 203/ 1991,48 and conflicted many
judicial precedents..49 Besides, the distinction between the State’s private and public

47

The Court of Cassation, Appeal no. 13598/ 78, on 28 December 2009.

48

Article 12 of law no. 203/ 1991 states that: “…. The company’s funds are considered as the State’s private
ownership.”
49 The Administrative Court, Appeal no. 25661/ 61, on 28 April 2015. This rule affirmed that an entity that is
owned by the State and serves for public interests will be considered a private law entity as long as it is a
shareholder company that is governed by the law no. 203/ 1991
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ownership is well defined in judiciary and jurisprudence, as the latter must be
appointed to public services according to law. Accordingly, it cannot be subject to any
kind of legal transaction that may lead to the disposition of its ownership.50
In short, The Omar Effendi Company was owned by a holding company
which properties are private according to the applicable law. However, the Court
disregarded the distinction between the State’s public and private ownership in order
to overstretch the jurisdiction to decide upon the contested sale contracts, so it falsely
considered it as administrative contracts, not a civil contractual legal bond.
3. Deciding on Criminal Liability
The Court’s quest to stigmatize the contested contract as corrupt extended to seeking
more plausible ground for rendering these contracts null and void after many years of
its execution.
The Court enumerated the legal faults that severely affected the validity of the
designated process through which the deal was concluded. In fact, many violations of
the applicable law and administrative regulations have occurred. As a case in point,
these violations included the manipulation of the real value of the Company’s assets
that led to drastically degraded its returns, the turning over of non-offered assets to the
buyer freely, and accepting the remarkably low offer that was even strikingly less than
the already degraded value.
Yet, the Court knew that even these severe violations will not affect the legal
position of the transaction, it admitted that:
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The State Council’s legal opinion no. 537/ 2013, on 27 August 2013.
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Decisions that produce individual rights or personal legal status
cannot be withdrawn as long as it was validly issued in order to
achieve public interests which require the stability of these
decisions. On the contrary, invalid decisions must be withdrawn
by the competent authority in accordance with law and to correct
its irregularities. Even though, public interest also necessitates
maintaining the existence of invalid decisions when they resulted
in legal rights if a certain period of time has elapsed. Then, it
should be viewed as if it was validly issued. It is well established
that this period of time would be sixty days starting from the date
of issuance of the decision… so if this period of time elapsed the
invalid decision becomes immune.51
Hence, the Court was forced to address this obstacle that restricted its determination
to annul the contract, surprisingly, it criminalized these severe violations:
There are exceptional circumstances according to which the
sixty-day rule will not be applied, first: if the decision was issued
as a result of severe violation of law that turns it from a legal act
into just a material one with no legal effect; second, if obtaining
such a decision was due to the beneficiary’s fraud… whereas the
decision in question has been issued in a severe violation of the
applicable laws and the designated procedures for selling public
ownership, and whereas these violations were too severe to the
extent that it led to the dissipation of public wealth in turn of
unrealistic price…. Therefore, this decision became merely a
material act, not a legal one. Accordingly, it does not enjoy any
immunity, no matter the elapsed time.52
Therefore, the Court pointed out that this decision which led to concluding the
contract was completely void and enjoyed no immunity. It argued that the act of
concluding this contract was a result of a series of crimes, on top of which is the
felony of dissipation of public wealth. It asserted that this crime was committed in
conspiracy conduct between the public officials in charge and the investor.

51
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Omar Effendi, supra note 8.
Id.
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Dissipation of public wealth is a serious felony that is criminalized according
to the Egyptian Panel Code,53 being described as “serious” in the Egyptian criminal
judicial system means that the process through which this convection is done through
a complex process. It started with the public prosecution investigations that usually
include several procedural aspects, requesting technical expertise, and the suspect’s
interrogation. If the investigations point out the weighting of the suspect’s criminal
liability, the criminal court starts to hold hearing sessions, demonstrates the adduced
evidence, and evaluates the suspect’s defense. Eventually, it renders its judgment.
Therefore, The Court reversed another fundamental constitutional principle
and violated another public policy consideration. It acted on behalf of the competent
criminal court to decide that severe violations encompassed the contract in question
constituted the felony of dissipation of public wealth. Therefore, the Court used this
understanding to decide that the sale contract, as an administrative decision, cannot be
considered as a legal act, it rather a completely void order that does not produce any
legal effect, and is not immune, no matter what time has elapsed.
What more is, the Court ignored a previous decision issued from the public
prosecution in which it decided, after excluding this potentiality, that there was no
dissipation of public wealth.54 Even though, the Court impliedly rendered a criminal
judgment against public officials in light of its own discretionary criteria.
4. The Issue of Res Judicata

53 Article 116 repetitive of the Panel Code punish public officials who deliberately commit acts that lead to the
loss of money possessed by the entity they work for or are responsible for.
54 Omar Effendi, supra note 8, reference is made to the conclusion of the Public Prosecution investigations
mentioned earlier in footnote no. 16.
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The Court’s analysis to characterize the contested contract as administrative served its
strategy in multi-levels. It overcame another considerable obstacle which is the
arbitration clauses embodied therein. The existence of an arbitration clause should
prevent that Court, as well as any other judicial body from reviewing it according to
the inherent principle of Separability.
Separability of the arbitration clause is a well-founded principle that makes
this clause, whether embodied in the main agreement or concluded in a separate one,
fully independent from the original contract. This means that the arbitration clause
represents a single agreement per se, so it does not be affected by the nullity of the
original agreement.55 This rule is acknowledged both on the national and international
level, so that it can be found in nearly identical wording in the Egyptian Arbitration
law,56 UNCITRAL rules,57 and ICC rules.58
Accordingly, deciding that the sale contract is null and void does not affect the
validity of its arbitration clause. To that end, having decided that the sale contract is
purely an administrative contract, the Court managed to exploit the requirement of
article (1) of the Egyptian Arbitration law which necessitates the competent minister’s
approval.59 The Court further warranted that this approval is a public policy
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Fathi Wali, ARBITRATION IN CIVIL AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES- SCHOLARLY AND
PRACTICALLY, 104 (2014).
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The Egyptian Arbitration law on Civil and Commercial Matters no. 27/ 1994, been published on 21 April 1994.
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consideration that cannot be overcome, the absence of which leads the arbitration
clause embodied in the contested sale contract to be null and void, no matter what
legal considerations it previously produced.60
Amongst all the contradictions that this series of judgments invoked, still this
conclusion comes on top of them. In fact, the parties to the contested contract did not
conclude it as an administrative contract, not the CNBC, not the government, and
surely not the investor. For them, it was a commercial contract concluded between
two companies that acted on their capacities as private law bodies and is governed by
the concerned civil law, not the administrative law. The requirement of the competent
minister’s approval is not required on that basis.
Furthermore, article 1 (2) of the Arbitration law did not strictly require the
explicit approval of the competent minister, in other words, this approval might be
expressed impliedly.61
Assuming that the contested contract was an administrative one, one should
question the significance of the NCBC’s initiation to file case no. 583/ 2008 before
the CRCICA seeking the annulment of that contract. Does not that give an indication
that this holding company, which the Court argued that it was a representative of the
Minister of Investment, got the required ministerial approval impliedly? Not
mentioning the sophisticated process of preparing the transaction, the approvals of the
minister of investment and of the Cabinet, and all the procedural steps that the Court
was keen to trace.
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Article 55 of the Arbitration Law gives arbitral awards the power of the res
judicata and obliges all the relevant authorities to enforce it as long as it was rendered
in accordance with its provisions.62
There are numerous judicial precedents that profoundly prohibit re-examining
the subject matter before the judiciary when it was settled before the arbitration in
accordance with the law requirements on the basis of the principle of res judicata.63
The phrase “in accordance with law” refers to the validity of the arbitration clause
itself,64 as well as the existence of other fundamental conditions, such as the unity of
the parties, the basis of their dispute, and subject matter in question,65 otherwise, this
authority will not exist.66
Certainly, the Court chose to depend on the literal requirement of article 1 (2)
to escape the issue of res judicata. Thus, it used this escaping valve to get rid of the
arbitration clause and the previous arbitral award that had the authority of res
judicata. Hence, it insisted that the arbitration clause of the sale contract is null and
void in the absence of the approval of the competent minister’s approval.
B.

The Court’s additional justifications

Critical reading to the Court’s legal analysis does not suffice to answer that pressing
question: why did the Court do that?
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The answer cannot be that the Court’s legal knowledge fell short of the proper,
inherent, and well-founded legal solutions to the issues of this case. In fact, the Court
exhaustively tried to orientate its rationale in a lengthy sophisticated manner by
employing national legal rules and international arbitration principles.
However, the answer to this question will start to come to the surface once the
link between the timing of this judicial decision and the contemporary political and
societal context is drawn. This decision was delivered shortly after the 25 January
2011 revolution which led to the collapse of the then political regime,67 an
unprecedented environment existed for many opponents to exploit the Egyptian
judiciary as one arena for manifesting their disagreement with the previous regime’s
policies. Of course, accusations of corruption were the most repetitive allegations.68
Granted that, the Court in Omar Effendi appeared respondent to this tendency,
it reacted in accordance with, and under the influence of the contemporary
circumstances. This standpoint can be seen in the Court’s utilizing of two strategies.
First, it adopted a non-pure legal analysis,69 Second, it provoked the potential of
resorting to the international arbitration before ICSID where it was a non-contested
matter.
These two strategies disclosed that the Court believed that the process of
concluding the contested contract was riddled with corruption, and it led to the loss of
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principal economic resources. So that, it sought to rectify the odd results of
privatizing this publicly-owned Company by delivering a decision that can be used to
regain its sold assets to the Country’s ownership. Besides, it was aware of the claims
that may be initiated by the investor against Egypt due to its judgment.
1. Employing Non-Pure Legal Logic
One of the main traditional functions of judiciary in civilized societies is to settle the
individuals’ disputes in accordance with the law, and in light of that society’s legal
rules which must be characterized by generality and abstraction.70 Hence, courts
employ applicable legal rules that govern issues in question, in light of the given
relevant facts, in order to deliver a judicial decision that should be compatible with
the law.
However, the Court did not follow that logic, it rather built a considerable part
of its decision on non-pure legal orientation. The wording of its decision was radically
unfamiliar with the traditional form of judicial judgments.71
The non-legal content of the Court’s decision is characterized by enumerating
the tangible evidence of the ex-public officials’ responsibility towards the failure of
administering the publicly-owned projects which led to the disposal of it. In addition
to the glorification of publicly-owned enterprises, and the necessity to keep the State’s
control over means of production.
First, the Court believed that the previous governments deliberately
“mismanaged the public sector by yielding its responsibilities to inefficient
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administration”. Thus, “it let corruption prevails in order to degrade its value and to
sell it to national and foreign investors”.
Moreover, it disapproved the public officials’ corrupt manner “as they get rid
of the Omar Effendi Company as if it is an abomination they must purify, or an
expired product that should be disposed at any cost”. In addition, it condemned those
politicians’ management with respect to the sale transaction and “the strong
suspicious indulgence” they offered to the investor to pass the deal.72
Consequently, the Court charged all the public figures of the State of being
tools to facilitate the foreign intervention in the nation’s domestic policies. It affirmed
their liability “for dissipating public wealth and devastating the national economy.”
It interpreted their manner as “they were bribed to work on implementing the
policy of privatization”, and that they were submitted to foreign prejudiced conditions
which “enabled the representatives of the governments of the USA and other
international financial institutions who conspired to devastate Egypt’s public sector
and to encroach its sovereignty and independence.”73
The Court next turned to glorify the State’s ownership of means of production.
It signified that the State previously managed to “guide the public sector to significant
successes that led to establishing great projects like the High Dam”. And, that the
public sector’s projects “led the nation to build and develop industrial civilization”, so
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that the State should have maintained and worked on supporting and developing its
public ownership instead of dissipating it.74
The Court continued to enumerate what it viewed as “privileges” of the State’s
control of public sector enterprises. And, it kept giving advice on how the government
should make the best use of it on both the management and the economic levels. It
even went farther by explaining how the privatization policy should have been
adopted and implemented.75
2. Citing the Concept of Transnational Public Policy
To continue on defending its rationale, the Court was keen on invoking the possibility
of the investor’s claiming for damages before the ICSID arbitration. It was aware that
the investor will view its decision as an expropriation of his property, which gives
legitimate reason to resort to international arbitration claiming damages.76
Indeed, the sequence of legal faults committed by the Court served to
substantiate its argument with regard to this part. Confirming that the contested
contract was concluded corruptly led the Court to argue that contracts of corruption
are not protected under the umbrella of international arbitration according to the
concept of “transnational public policy”.
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Hence, the Court wanted to mirror this view through the lens of international
arbitration to sustain Egypt’s defense in future claims by giving reliable legal ground
for expropriating the investor’s ownership. Hence, it cited the concept of transnational
public policy to prove that it imitated the ICSID arbitration principles with regard to
contracts of corruption.
I believe that the Court should not have adopted this kind of reasoning. Its
function is to give legal answers to the issues in question, these answers should be
built on the relevant facts and the applicable law. But the Court used to justify its
legal answers and sought to substantiate its rationale by building on irrelevant facts,
assumptions, and the analysis of uncontested matters.
To sum up, this chapter demonstrated the Court’s rationale with regard to
particular procedural and substantive matters in Omar Effendi. It enumerates the legal
faults that the Court made to render the sale contract null and void, particularly as it
extended its jurisdiction to place itself in the position of civil and criminal courts, and
arbitral tribunals to achieve this goal.
The Court’s aim to safeguard public wealth led it to relinquish its presumed
neutrality and integrity. It produced a judicial decision that mixed legal analysis with
irrelevant considerations, stressed the significance of the State’s public ownership,
and clearly encouraged its control over means of production. It generally accused expublic officials and investors of being corrupt, therefore, it argued that the latter
cannot claim compensation before the ICSID arbitration because contracts of
corruption are not protected in light of the concept of transnational public policy.
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Chapter three explains the notion of transnational public policy, and what the
relation between corruption and transnational public policy is. It addresses the issue of
deciding on corruption in commercial and investment contracts, and what the
evidence of corruption is, and how arbitral tribunals deal with it.

39

IV.

Corruption as a Transnational Public Policy Consideration

The Court in Omar Effendi cited an inherent principle in International Arbitration to
affirm that contracts of corruption are inadmissible before the ICSID arbitration as a
transnational public policy consideration. Hence, business procured through
corruption cannot be protected under domestic laws, international law, and the
Convention.
However, concluding that business was procured through corruption in
international arbitration is dependent on the process of analysis pursued and the
standard of proof accepted. The respective outcomes also are dependent on how the
concerned arbitral tribunal perceives the allegation of corruption, what standards of
proof it relies upon, and what evidence it accepts.
This chapter addresses these aspects successively. The first section of this
chapter is dedicated to the concept of public policy. It begins with an attempt to define
the concept, describe its nature, characteristics, and forms. It next lists its levels.
Further, this section traces the concept of public policy as utilized in the field of
international arbitration.
The second section of the chapter focuses on corruption as a specific
consideration of transnational public policy under the realm of international
arbitration. And, it points out the two main approaches in evaluating corruption. Next,
evidence of corruption will be discussed with regard to its burden of proof, standards,
and extent.
This analysis will be linked to case law from domestic jurisdictions and
international arbitral tribunals to manifest how corruption is perceived and
administered from their lens. This demonstration serves the process of analyzing the
outcomes that the Court in Omar Effendi came up with to show the fallacy of its
conclusion.
A. Public Policy: an Overview
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Finding an exhaustive definition of the content of ‘public policy’ is almost
impossible;77 consequently, it is argued that all devoted efforts to do so fall short of
reaching a proper delineation,78 or precise definition.79
In fact, there is sound logic in this ambiguity. Flexibility is one distinguishing
characteristic of public policy, because each nation has its own cultural, moral, and
ethical heritage, and these values keep evolving over time.80 As a consequence, public
policy has always been viewed as a vague concept that is constantly changing to the
extent that it may lead to uncertainty and unpredictability.81
This vagueness is graphically described by Justice Burrough as he portrays
public policy as “a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it, you never
know where it will carry you. It may lead you from sound law. It is never argued at
all, but when other points fail.”82 This oft-quoted observation expresses the risks that
employing the concept of public policy in the international commercial arbitration
field may result in, as it can undermine the concerned parties’ legal agreements or
lead to the setting aside of the arbitral awards they obtain.83
This apparent contradiction between the nature of nations’ public policy with
its unpredictability along with the objectives of international trade, which counts
heavily on visibility and foreseeability, has led to certain developments in
differentiating among levels of public policy that national courts and arbitrators
operate in. Accordingly, the award may be invalidated at the national arbitration level
due to violating domestic public policy, while it could be enforced if it is rendered in
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international arbitration,84 a conclusion that coincides with the necessity of employing
a narrower perspective of public policy at the international level.85
1. Characterizing the Concept of Public Policy
Almost all legal systems encounter the question of what the concept of public policy
is, as it is pleaded before various courts and arbitral tribunals on a daily basis.86 The
vagueness of its nature maximized the discretionary power of national courts as to
delineating its boundaries.87 Similarly, legal scholars have always engaged in the
debate in order to reach a clear articulation of the concept.
Judiciaries have examined this concept of public policy by giving various
explanations that share common elements. In England, it is seen as “that principle of
law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public, or against public good.”88 Similarly, the Egyptian courts have
repeatedly upheld that public policy is considered to be those rules “aiming to achieve
a public interest, whether political, social, or economic, pertaining to the society’s
high order and which prevails over the individual’s interest.”89 In the United States,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania likens it to the public good:
Anything that tends clearly to injure the public health,
the public morals, the public confidence, in the purity of
the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense
of security for individual rights, whether of personal
liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to
feel, is against public policy.90
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To that end, it is quite clear that attempts to crystalize the concept of public
policy produce common substantive and procedural characteristics that most
jurisdictions and legal scholars have agreed upon. It consists of a group of rules that
govern and organize the most fundamental social, economic, and political interests of
a given society;91 it usually manifests a state’s “basic notions of morality and
justice”,92 so that it encompasses the “least rudiments of natural justice” that
guarantee due process.”93 A state’s public policy does not reflect a certain regime’s
political perspective, because it is not related to the state’s political stance or its
international policies,94 as it may be altered from one generation to another.95
Moreover, rules of public policy intervene when the public sphere should
trump individuals’ private legal acts,96 so that it profoundly limits their freedom to
contract by imposing certain standards that are not subject to derogation.97 For
instance, the prohibition of monopoly to protect certain economic policies, or to
invalidate an arbitral agreement with regard to real estate disputes in order to protect
the rights of the state and of third parties are cases in point.98
Hence, public policy represents “the final parameter of the law that, while it is
reflected in and often expressed by statutory and constitutional statements of law, also
dictates either consent or constraint, permission or prohibition, when statutes and
constitutions are silent on a given matter.”99 Accordingly, rules of public policy may
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be enshrined explicitly in a state’s constitution,100 or in a private law that sets “the
legal basis on which rests the society’s economic or moral order.”101
2. Levels of Public Policy
Given public policy is characterized as a group of rules that aim to protect a certain
society’s values suggests that these rules address and organize the relationships of a
specific state’s individuals. However, this assumption does not function in the world
of international trade. In other words, only one understanding of what constitutes
public policy cannot be perceived in domestic and international level of interactions
in the same manner.
As a result, generating more flexible rules whereby different states can
manage and comprehend international commercial practice is required. In
international commercial arbitration, national judiciaries have to differentiate between
those rules that must prevail on the domestic level, and those tested in the
international sphere.
a. Domestic Public Policy
When dealing with national arbitration in which concerned parties, applicable law,
and the entire process are administered under the state’s legal system, a national court
only considers its own domestic public policy.102
On this level, local standards of public policy, as viewed through the lens of
the judiciary, prevail -either when the award is contested or its enforcement is
sought.103
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In this case, national courts apply their domestic public policy rules that do
not permit derogation, as they pursue fundamental national interests and protect
morals.104 Accordingly, an entire contract could be struck down if found against a
governmental economic policy,105 or violating municipal mandatory regulations.106
Likewise, a national court may justify its refusal to enforce a domestic arbitral award
if it breaches a mandatory rule.107
b. International Public Policy
When a legal question before a national court is related to more than one country’s
legal system, it has to deal with its international dimension.108 In this case, a domestic
court applies less restrictive rules of its own public policy, a policy “viewed through
the lens of the state’s own laws or standards for dealing with a foreign arbitral
award,” so it is a narrower perspective of a state’s public policy inspired by
international purposes.109
Thus, the application of the concept of a state’s public policy in private
international law may bar the application of a foreign law or, the recognition of a
foreign arbitral award by its national judiciary.110 However, this is only the case when
the national court applies a narrower perspective of its public policy.
Through this narrower version of a state’s international public policy, national
courts examine whether enforcement of the foreign arbitral award violates the

104

Ismaeil, supra note 81, at 826.

105

Buchanan, supra note 97, at 513.

106

Wali, supra note 55, at 770.

107

Court of Cassation, Appeal no. 810/ 71 (25 January 2007). The court upheld the decision of the Cairo Court of
appeal that the contested award violates the Egyptian public policy as it awarded an interest rate that exceeds the
fixed maximum limit.
108

Margaret Moses, Public Policy Under the New York Convention: National, International, and Transnational, in
Katia Fach Gomez and Ana M. Lopez-Rodrigues (eds), 60 years of the New York Convention: Key Issues and
Future CHALLENGES. 169–184, 173 (2019).

109 Christopher B Kuner, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the
United States and West Germany Under the New York Convention, 7 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, 79 (1990).
110

Pierre Mayer, Effect of International Public Policy in International Arbitration, 15 PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 61–69, 61 (2006).

45

fundamental principles and values of its legal system.111 This is because not every
domestic legal rule necessarily forms a part of the state’s international public
policy.112 Accordingly, for challenging a foreign arbitral award, it has to invoke
something more than the violation of the law of the enforcement state. For this
reason, public policy in the context of international arbitration should be construed as
being applied in the field of private international law.113
A dichotomy between domestic and international public policy is thus
justifiable given the different objectives each peruses.114 The latter is derived from the
conventions or international declarations that the state has ratified, so it constitutes
universal principles shared by nations of a similar level of civilization, in order to
protect fundamental values.115
c. Transnational Public Policy
While both domestic and international levels represent two different perceptions of
public policy, they both stem from one source which is the concerned state’s
perception. On the contrary, transnational public policy norms neither belong to a
single state nor reflect a certain nation’s viewpoint. They are rather, as the term
suggests, those considerations that transcend states’ boundaries.116
The emergence of the concept “transnational public policy” for the first time
is attributed to Professor Pierre Lalive in his 1986 article Transnational (or Truly
International) Public Policy and International Arbitration.117 Although, as Professor
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Alan Redfern commented, the term “transnational” arose as coined by Judge Jessup
in the 1950s,118 the novelty of explicitly bringing the concept into the world of
international commercial arbitration is attributed to the former.
Professor Lalive may have found it more convenient to characterize the
concept of “transnational” public policy as “truly international” public policy. In fact,
some commentators consider this as an attempt to distinguish it from the classic or the
more “traditional” international public policy of states.119 Others criticize the
confusion that it entails, either for overlapping the two concepts as “international”
suggests, or for ascribing untested qualifications as “truly” implies.120
While transnational public policy also has no precise definition, it can be
characterized by its nature, sources, and functions.
It is said that practices of the operators of international trade in their own
realm, which exhibits coherence and solidarity, led to regrouping their community as
a distinct social order. This societas mercatorum enjoys an overriding normativity in
it and is governed by the lex mercatoria where distinctive, essential, and widely
shared values are acknowledged.121
It follows that public policy to that order has been posited in terms of
mandatory norms. These norms, created, interpreted, and modified by those
operators, and as well accepted by other civil societies around the world, have a
universal character and have become the “sign of the maturity of the international
communities.”122
Thus, transnational public policy can best be characterized as basic legal rules
and principles that are commonly recognized among different nations. It does not
118
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relate to a certain state, rather it does involve a public policy that transcends state
boundaries.123 These rules and principles are derived from abstract ideas of morality,
ethics, and justice. They function as a sensor that discards offensive choices and
renders unenforceable the law chosen or the contract agreed upon by the parties to an
international contract.124
The notion that there are shared rules that manifest the abstract ideas of
morality and justice is well-rooted in most, if not all, legal systems, and resides in the
heart of international arbitration as well. As the arbitral tribunal noted in WDF vs.
Kenya when it distinguished the three levels of public policy, it pointed out a sort of
violation that does not relate to a single jurisdiction, including international. Rather, it
pointed to a universal value in stating that “[t]he term ‘international public policy’ is
sometimes used with another meaning, signifying an international consensus as to
universal standards and accepted norms of conduct that must be applied in all
fora.”125 In that sense, the Tribunal in WDF vs. Kenya signified that although national
courts are applying their own international public policy as per usual, however,
perceiving this universal concept of public policy started to be reflected in their
decisions.
This tendency is seen in W v. F and V in which the Swiss Federal Tribunal
took into account a “universal conception of public policy, under which an award will
be incompatible with public policy if it is contrary to the fundamental moral or legal
principles recognized in all civilised countries.”126
B. Corruption in International Contracts Through the Lens of Transnational
Public Policy
The concept of corruption is one of the norms that distinguish transnational public
policy from other levels of public policy. It is a norm that was generated by private
actors in international business and became binding even before it was enshrined in
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international conventions by states.127 This specific issue has been prioritized by
merchants as well as by states due to the catastrophic consequences it causes both on
business and on states’ economies.
1. Corruption is a Public Enemy
Twenty-five years ago, James D. Wofensohn, a former President of the World Bank
described corruption as cancer which “diverts resources from the poor to rich,
increases the cost of running businesses, distorts public expenditures, and deters
foreign investors, and … we all know that it is a major barrier to sound and equitable
development.”128 Seventeen years later, the same fact was ascertained by another
President, as he described corruption in the developing world as “public enemy
number one.”129
Identifying corruption as “a public enemy” reflects the seriousness of this
phenomenon and mirrors its destructive consequences on the national economies as
well as on international trade. The cost of corruption in the field of international trade
is alarming; World Bank estimations indicate that 1 trillion in USD in bribes is paid
on a yearly basis throughout the world.130
Corruption in the field of international investment contracts as viewed from
investors’ perspective is defined as “actions of transfer of money or anything of value
to foreign public officials, either directly or indirectly, to obtain favorable public
decisions in the course of international trade.”131 From the host states’ perspective, it
is commonly defined as the “abuse or misuse of a position of trust or responsibility
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for private gain rather than the purpose for which that trust or responsibility is
conferred.”132
These definitions suggest two main actors: the public official and the investor.
Yet, it tolerates, as is often the case, a third party who facilitates the indirect
channeling of corrupt forms of advantage. According to this thinking, it follows that a
transfer of benefits across national borders occurs, from the seeker of a favorable
public decision, typically by bribery, through the intermediary to the decision-maker
in order to obtain this decision in the context of international trade.133
Acts of corruption through which those actors operate result in benefitting a
limited number of individuals at the expense of entire states’ economies and of the
international business environment.
On the one hand, corrupt practices hinder the flow of fair business; ‘fairness’
requires that it be competitive which, in turn, triggers creativity, incites the
production of good quality goods and services, and motivates the offering of lower
prices. But when bribery becomes the channel through which a public procurement is
obtained, attention is redirected to reimbursing the cost of obtaining the contract.
On the other hand, quality becomes less important along with the higher
prices paid by the taxpayer who pays for the cost of corrupt practices by receiving
goods and services of inferior quality at high prices. Corruption also brings other
destructive factors like alienating fair-minded investors, stopping foreign aid,
dissipating public resources, and drowning the economy in overburdening debt.
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In brief, “corruption creates, and accentuates poverty within a country,”134 for
these reasons, it is public enemy number one for both developing countries and fair
international business operators.
2. Corruption is a Pure Manifestation of Transnational Public Policy
Corruption is an issue that straightforwardly curtails debate about the content
of transnational public policy,135 as it unanimously condemned by almost all
societies, the major religious and moral schools of thought, and municipal
legislatures.136 It is seen as a value that is essential, is supported by a large consensus,
and requires immediate attention regardless of any contrary agreement.137
Corruption as a transnational public policy principle was expressed by Judge
Lagregren in the landmark decision in ICC case no.1110 of 1963.138 He explained
that a contract is invalid when it violates not only relevant domestic legislations, but
also international public policy.
Also, he emphasized that “it cannot be contested that there exists a general
principle of law recongised by civilised nations that contracts which seriously violate
bonos mores international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and that
they cannot be sanctioned by courts or arbitrators.”139 This statement illustrates that
being a transnational public policy consideration, corruption contracts cannot be
upheld either before national courts or in international arbitration.
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This widely shared view is reflected in international conventions concluded
under the auspices of the United Nations,140 and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD),141 to commit states criminalizing various
forms of corruption. It is also seen in the works of International Financial Institutions,
such as the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.
Therefore, being against transnational public policy, the existence of
corruption in a contested contract authorizes the arbitrator to raise the issue ex officio
regardless of the applicable law, or even the parties’ agreement from which the
arbitrator derives his or her authority.
This was the case in WDF vs. Kenya whereby the Tribunal found that the
applicable law’s perspective towards bribery was irrelevant, as was the case for any
local custom in the host state. This is because under no circumstances would the
Tribunal validate “bribery committed by the Claimant in violation of international
public policy.”142 Judge Lagregren adopted the same stance as to invoke ex officio the
illegality of the contract:
Whether one is taking the point of view of good government
or that of commercial ethics it is impossible to close one’s
eyes to the destructive effect thereof on the business pattern
with consequent impairment of industrial progress. Such
corruption is an international evil; it is contrary to good
morals and to an international public policy common to the
community of nations.143
As these standpoints are well established, there is no difficulty in inferring
that international arbitrators have legal and moral obligations to not ‘close their eyes’
to corrupt practices. They should discard any agreement that is, if proven, riddled
with corruption, and refrain from upholding a contract that the tribunal, upon
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sufficient evidence, was procured corruptly. This is the case whether upon a party’s
challenge or ex officio.
Hence, it becomes a necessity to identify the process through which the
evaluation of evidence of corruption is done, and to point out which criterion or
standard of proof is employed by international arbitrators to decide whether the
allegation or suspicion of corruption is approved or refuted.
C. Evaluating the Evidence of Corruption
Generally speaking, it is well established in the field of international arbitration that
upon the requirements of due process, arbitrators have wide discretionary power to
determine the procedure of the claim. They can next determine the admissibility and
the relevance of adduced evidence.144 In addition, this authority extends to empower
the arbitrators to adopt any set of rules prepared by any specialized institution they
see fit and appropriate for their case.145 In other words, the process of gathering
evidence in international arbitration is not restricted by any rigid national
procedures.146 This is a merit that has escaped the traditional common law/civil law
debate about the presentation of evidence and standard of proof.147
Another general rule with regard to the burden of proof is that the parties are
obliged to prove the facts that sustain their cases,148 such a fundamental principle that
exists in all domestic legislations and judiciaries, and is unanimously recognized in
the scholarship and the arbitration practice.149
The process of evaluating evidence of corruption seems to be influenced by
three principal factors. The first is the existing attitudes of international arbitrators in
144
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evaluating corruption, and the second is the standard of proof they employ. The third
is the extent to which the adduced evidence may influence the cogency of the parties’
arguments.
1. International Arbitrators’ Attitudes in Evaluating Evidence
In response to the case of corruption, where the arbitrators’ subjectivity is presumed,
two opposing models of attitudes can be found: the repressive attitude and the
indifferent attitude.
a. The Repressive Tendency
The proponents of the repressive model believe that arbitrators must become
suppressers whenever the parties’ choices run against moral rules, especially when
these rules call for condemnation of a certain breach. They understand the role of
international arbitrators is like that of national judges in that they are each obligated
not to close their eyes to corruption. Although arbitrators are appointed by the parties,
they still have the authority to eschew complicity in corruption which could
contravene public policy objectives and undermine any arbitrated resolution.150
This model upholds the foundational values of transnational public policy,
taking into account the destructive effects of corruption on international trade, on the
running of businesses, and on the state’s economic prosperity. The repressive
tendency is best represented by the-well known principle set forth by Judge
Lagregren.151
b. The Indifferent Tendency
The second model’s advocates do not consider corruption in international
trade as an absolute universal moral value. Thus, they do not believe that arbitrators
should condemn corrupt practices. This model’s starting point is to question the
reality of objective immutable values. In particular, it doubts the viability and
necessity of applying the same moral rules to different societies, especially in light of
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the cultural and societal differences between modern Western rational governments
and the governments of more traditional values.152
This model’s supporters further argue that traditional societies may adopt the
modern state model, however, their traditional practices with regard to governmental
decision-making remain subject to the authoritarian scheme. As a matter of fact, in
such a society the process of obtaining a favorable public decision from a public
figure in terms of a paid bribery is not an act that is heavily condemned.153
When it comes to judging corruption before international arbitration, this
tendency justifies the arbitrator’s not condemning the contested corrupt practice as his
or her mission should not imitate a state judge’s function. This is because the latter’s
mindset pushes him or her to apply the obligatory norms and rules of law of his or her
country. Alternatively, an international arbitrator functions within a social space in
which the conceptions of moral values may intersect or be noticeably inconsistent.
This is typically the case with regard to different perceptions of corruption in modern
and traditional societies.154
In addition, it is also argued by those advocates that, being independent from
national regulations, arbitrators should position themselves as upholding fundamental
principles on which the mechanism of arbitration is built like parties’ autonomy. They
also have to consider the peculiarity of the immediate purpose of trade which is
profit-making.155
c. Analysis
One can easily find many examples that represent the repressive tendency in
condemning corruption in international trade. The well-known statement of Judge
Lagregren and the award in WDF vs. Kenya serves this purpose. On the contrary, this
research did not find such an award that explicitly adopted the indifferent tendency’s
attitude.
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It is my contention that it is already well-established that corruption has
become a transnational public policy consideration and its condemnation is
inescapable. This fact is the result of the experienced consequences of corrupt
practices on international business and societies, and is propounded by the efforts of
the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the International Financial
Institutions. Hence, the large consensus on the condemnation of corruption is
characterized in its prohibition in most, if not all, domestic legislations. Accordingly,
the indifferent tendency seems to exist more in theory than actual arbitral practices.
This analysis does not suggest that there is a uniform approach in adjudicating
corruption in arbitration practices, though it does propose the omnipresence of the
repressive tendency. Where there is an established institution that makes it clear that
corruption is not tolerated, however, there is no great coherence in determining what
evidence is sufficient to constitute or to test the allegation of corruption.
Granted that, incoherent practices are partly warranted by the very nature of
the composition of arbitral tribunal. This process brings together members from
different cultures whose beliefs and attitudes remain subject to, and inspired by, their
social and cultural background. This results in variations of their approaches to the
question of corruption.
Therefore, the process of analyzing adduced evidence of corruption may
produce other solutions to embody their individual beliefs towards corruption. These
beliefs may stem from the arbitrators’ preferences as to whether his or her moral
values should or should not outweigh any other consideration, such as the flow of
business or legitimate expectations of the investment.
2. Standard of Proof in Corruption Matters
The previous analysis suggests that there is no known arbitral tribunal that is likely to
acknowledge the existence of corruption and let questionable contracts escape
sanction.
However, an arbitrator who advocates the repressive tendency will be in favor
of setting the bar of proof low, while another arbitrator who is a proponent of the
indifferent tendency will be keen to apply a high level of proof. Accordingly,
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adopting a certain standard of proof would be probably an indication of the attitude
through which the arbitrator would administer the adduced facts.156
a. High Level of Proof
A high level of proof takes the position that corruption is a strong accusation - an evil
that must be combated well beyond a party simply escaping from its contractual
obligations. This position requires heightened levels of proof that stems from superior
direct evidence. Thus, evidence resulting from a clear and convincing presentation of
facts can suffice to affirm the allegation of corruption.157
A clear-cut example of this position can be identified in one ICC award where
the claimant raised the allegation of forgery which, like the case of corruption, falls
under fraudulent actions. The tribunal noted that “[t]here are no international rules on
the burden of proof, but it is commonly accepted by ICC arbitral tribunals
that allegations of fraud call for a high standard of evidence.” 158 The tribunal
questioned the “number of potentially troubling circumstances in support of this
proposition” argued by the claimant, and believed that these evidential circumstances
were insufficient to establish the alleged fraud.
b. The Normal Weighing of Probabilities: ICC Case no. 6497
Contrary to a high level of proof, the opposite position – the normal weighing of
probabilities – does not require the same level of evidence. This approach advocates
assessing the normal weighing of probabilities, thus setting the bar of proof low if the
process of evidence gathering is problematic.159 This is seen in ICC case no. 6497
whereby the tribunal relied on a low standard of proof on the extent to which the
counter-evidence was sufficient to refute the allegation of corruption based on some
relevant, but not conclusive, evidence. However, it stated that this position, which is
based on the procedural rules of the applicable Swiss law, could only be resorted to in
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exceptional circumstances and for a good reason where such change in the burden of
proof is accessible and not too burdensome.160
Although the tribunal, in this case, made it clear that its position –in cases lack
conclusive evidence of allegation of corruption– was exceptional and only resorted to
in limited situations. However, this position strengthens the suggestion that when the
tribunal set the low standard of proof, it may usually indicate that “the arbitrators seek
to facilitate the task of concluding that there is indeed an intent or an act of corruption
in the facts at their disposal.”161
3. Extraction of Proof in Corruption Matters
The adoption of a certain standard of proof by the tribunal leads to the determination
of nature and relevance of evidence of whether corruption exists. This step is usually
governed by the significance of adduced evidence, so that the tribunal may find a
single clear and direct testimony attributed to one of the parties suffice to proving
corruption, contrarily, numerous indirect incidents would be seemed insufficient.
When an arbitral tribunal faces the issue of potential corruption, either as to
invoke the matter ex officio, or upon the defense of the alleging party, it usually
investigates numerous elements. These elements may extend to the extraction of
relevant facts from the clauses of the contract, its surrounding circumstances, related
documentation, testimony, relevant facts, or any other method that may serve the
required standard of proof set by the tribunal.162 Next, upon the criteria that arbitral
tribunal deploys to examine the allegation of corruption, the number of facts and
weight of evidence is then determined.
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a. Abundance of Evidence
Setting a high level of proof usually result in failing of proving corruption. This is
because the nature of corrupt agreements is characterized by secrecy and is covered
by numerous misleading agreements.
Certainly, when the tribunal choses to heighten the level of proof, it decides to
depend on a combination of relevant facts and evidence to analyze the question of
corruption. Such a choice was shown in the abovementioned ICC case where the
arbitrators found that the allegation of fraud had not been proven upon the failure of
the alleging party to furnish sufficient evidence.163 Although the tribunal assumed that
the surrounding circumstances indicated the possibility of its occurrence, along with
the tribunal’s acknowledgment of the difficulties facing the alleging parties to gather
more evidence, it favored the establishment of more clear and convincing evidence.
b. Common Intention vs. Single Intention
Furthermore, in searching for the intention of corruption as a motive to
conclude the contract, particularly in consultancy contracts between the investor and
the intermediary, the tribunal may set the bar of proof high. Hence, it may require that
the corrupt intention exist amongst all of the involved parties. Upon applying the
Swiss law, the arbitral tribunal in ICC case no. 9333 required that the purpose of
corruption must be pursued by the two parties’ common and shared intention, so that
suspicions about the knowledge of one of them of the other’s corrupt intention did not
qualify the contract to be found illegal due to corruption.164
On the contrary, when the tribunal set the bar low in consultancy contracts, it
may find that the proof of one corrupt intention is sufficient. This would meet the
expectations of the repressive tendency’s advocates. Thus, the tribunal in this case
would render the agreement null and void.
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The tribunal in ICC case no. 6248 declared that claims raised upon an
offensive secret commission agreement ought to be rejected.165 The claimant
concluded a consultancy contract with the defendant according to which the former
was to assist the latter in securing saving on costs of a project. This project was
initiated by the defendant as a contractor and on behalf of a joint venture. The
defendant’s work was supervised by an architectural firm. A dispute arose when the
defendant refused to pay the consultant’s contractual compensation that was fixed at a
certain sum. The defendant argued before the tribunal that this agreement covered an
illegal relationship between the defendant and the supervisor’s firm appointed by the
joint venture to monitor his performance. Thus, the defendant contended that this
supervisor abused its position to extort payments from the defendant through
collusion.166
Although the tribunal asserted that the common intent of the parties by
concluding the contested agreement was to harm the joint venture’s privilege, it
explicitly declared that “the freedom to shape the contents of a contract at the
discretion of the parties ends where either the contents itself or the connection
between contents and intentions or substantial motives of at least one party to the
contract are contra bonos mores.”167 The tribunal affirmed that parties’ freedom to
conclude legal agreements is not uncontrolled, when this freedom contradicts
transnational public policy it must be hindered. In this case, the tribunal found the
parties’ common intention to act corruptly makes their agreement unenforced.
Beyond that, it further declared that the same conclusion would be reached if the
intention to act corruptly is attributed to one of the parties.
The last standpoint would be favorable to the proponents of the repressive
tendency, however, relying upon the sole corruption intent of a party regardless of the

165

ICC Case no. 6248, 1990, Final Award, in Albert Jan Van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration
1994 - Volume XIX, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Volume 19 (© Kluwer Law International; ICCA &
Kluwer Law International 1994) pp. 124 – 140. Available at https://www-kluwerarbitrationcom.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/document/ipn4813?q=6248. Last accessed 20 March 2021.
166 Id. The tribunal explained that, upon the relevant facts adduced, “[a]ll … elements of an offensive secret
commission agreement are assembled in the … agreement: Claimant and defendant intended to secretly exercise
influence on the decisions of the Group (joint venture) for defendant’s benefit by inducing the architectural firm to
disregard the (joint venture’s) privileged fiduciary rights under the supervision contract.”
167

Id.

60

other party’s knowledge may result in a hazardous effect. It would be an easy way for
the party that was indebted or failed to meet its contractual obligation to escape its
sanction. Accepting such an allegation, especially with the normal weighing of
probabilities would facilitate that party’s ability to undermine and manipulate the
process of evidence gathering.168
Furthermore, arbitral practice suggests that examining the evidence of the
intermediary’s corrupt intention would suffice to establish the existence of
corruption.169 Developing the intermediary’s intent to resort to corruption after
concluding the contested agreement with the investor assumes that the latter does not
share this intent. This incident may occur when the bribed public officials intervened
to extort the intermediary after that agreement is done.
However, the tribunal may depend on some relevant facts to determine
whether there is a common intention shared by the investor and the intermediary,
such as the reasons for choosing that intermediary in particular, the investor’s
previous knowledge for the connections between the public official and the selected
intermediary, and whether the terms of their agreement are in compliance with the
applicable laws.170
To sum up, corruption is a sound manifestation of the concept of transnational
public policy, and is characterized as a moral value that has a large worldwide
consensus. Its destructive consequences impact businesses and states’ public wealth
led almost all states to criminalize corrupt practices, and this universal tendency is
encouraged by the international conventions and the condemnation by other
international organizations.
In the realm of international arbitration, while arbitrators have a moral and a
legal duty to combat corruption in international trade, however, their attitudes
towards corrupt practices are influenced by how the corruption is proved.
Accordingly, arbitration practices vary as to how evidence is evaluated.
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The next chapter is dedicated to evaluating the Omar Effendi decision, this
analysis aims at emphasizing that the Court failed to achieve what it aspired to both
on the national level and on the international level, on the contrary, it led to
catastrophic results.
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V.

Judging the Omar Effendi Decision

In Omar Effendi, the Court affirmed that the sale contract of the Company is a
contract of corruption and is inadmissible before the ICSID arbitration. It also alleged
that it aimed at safeguarding the public ownership and protecting serious investment.
This chapter assesses the Omar Effendi decision from two perspectives: (1)
the Court’s rationale for the issue of contracts of corruption and its significance on the
admissibility of the claims initiated before the ICSID arbitration. And, (2) the impact
of the Court’s decision on the Country’s public wealth, economy, and on investment
credibility.
The first segment of this chapter hypothesizes that the investor in Omar
Effendi resorts to the ICSID arbitration claiming damages resulting from the Court’s
decision. It envisages the conclusion that will be reached in light of the approaches
and practices as presented in chapter three.
For this purpose, a comprehensive comparison will be held between the
Court’s rationale and three ICSID arbitral awards with regard to the issue of
inadmissibility of contracts of corruption before the ICSID arbitration; the first award
is Union Fenosa in terms of its relevance as a main model of this study, the second is
WDF vs. Kenya which was cited by the Court, and the third is Metal Tech vs.
Uzbekistan due to its relevant facts.
The analysis exhibits successively the process of perceiving and analyzing
adduced evidence and serves to identify each tribunal’s approach to issues of burden
of proof, standard of proof, and evaluation of evidence.
The second segment of this chapter evaluates the outcomes of the Court’s
decision on the national level in light of this assessment. It explains the major
negative results it caused and demonstrates the odds it produced.
Through this demonstration, I claim that the Court failed to achieve what it
aspired, and that its attempt to rectify the odds which resulted in concluding the Omar
Effendi sale contract led to even worse results. I eventually suggest that the negative
results of the sale contract could have been mitigated if it applied the law properly.
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A. Evidentiary Matters Before ICSID Arbitration: Selected Awards
The process of analyzing, evaluating, and deciding upon allegation of corruption
raised by one of the parties before an arbitral tribunal necessitates investigating the
seriousness of this allegation, to determine which standard of proof is to be employed
and whether the party’s burden of proof is met.
Perceiving the adduced evidence is a critical process through which an
international arbitrator may decide to depend upon the existence of as many as
indirect circumstantial evidence, or to count on a single clear and direct evidence. In
other cases, an arbitrator may have the chance to avoid the debate over the party’s
burden of proof entirely; this happens when a party against whom the allegation of
corruption is invoked, voluntarily brings a clear evidence of their own corruption.
1. Presumptions and Circumstantial Evidence: Union Fenosa
In Union Fenosa, the Tribunal found that Egypt’s allegation of corruption does not
stand for a clear and direct evidence. Instead, it brought some separate incidents as
circumstantial evidence. As a result, it joined up these incidents to decide whether it
produced a plausible conclusion. However, the Tribunal eventually affirmed that
these incidents were not enough to substantiate Egypt’s allegation.
As previously mentioned, Egypt’s allegation of existing corruption on the part
of the Claimant in Union Fenosa was built on three separate bases: (1) the Claimant
choice of a corrupt subcontractor, (2) the Claimant’s engagement with a confident of
the then-President Mubarak, and (3) the engagement with an Egyptian business
partner who cultivated his connections with senior public officials to steer the project
to the Claimant’s favor.
However, the tribunal rejected two of these bases based on its weakness and
lack of evidence, and even asserted that “[t]hese two pleas should not have been made
by the Respondent based on the materials presented by it to the Tribunal.”171 On the
contrary, it found the issue of the involvement of the Claimant with the ‘alleged’
intermediary deserves to be considered due to the relevance of the adduced evidence.
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In the absence of any direct evidence of corruption, as per usual, the Tribunal
depended on an accumulation of circumstantial evidence, which it viewed as “as good
as direct evidence in proving corruption.”172
Circumstantial evidence is a technique employed by arbitrators to ascertain
facts that cannot be proven by direct evidence. This technique helps in deducting facts
“at which the evidence is directed from another connected fact”,173 because it is often
critical to arrive at decisions in corruption cases. This method leads to the inference
of a particular fact only when it is substantiated by a reasonable amount of other
circumstantial evidence. Hence, the availability of circumstantial evidence serves to
support the occurrence of the alleged fact.174 Beyond that, the Tribunal retains the
balance of probabilities as the prospective standard of proof.
With this standard of proof established, three principal factors were examined
in Union Fenosa to assess the allegation of corruption through circumstantial
evidence: the nature and the effectiveness of the intermediary’s participation in the
project, the nature and proportionality of the remuneration the intermediary received
from the Claimant, and his identity and status.
The adduced evidence was drawn from the disclosed documentation which
was composed of agreements, publicly reported interviews, minutes of the Claimant’s
internal meetings and a fax message.175
a. The Effectiveness of the Partner’s Participation to the Project
The Tribunal accepted the Claimant’s argument that this partner, along with his
family-owned company, was from the outset viewed as necessary to the project.176
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The Claimant explained that this partner was chosen because he was the first mover
of the project, 177 and due to his personal expertise and experience in the industry. 178
However, the Tribunal declined to recognize these justifications. In fact, it
inferred from the adduced evidence that the project was conceived by, and been
subject to previous developments on the Claimant’s behalf by others before this
partner’s involvement.179 Beyond that, it disputed the possibility that this partner
provided any significant capital to the project, as it materialized that the Claimant
would completely fund the project and “expects that [the latter] provide financing and
markets.”180 Moreover, all the evidential materials presented before the Tribunal were
affirmative that the partner’s professional limited expertise in the field of the project
did not warrant the choice made by the Claimant.181
Consequently, the Tribunal believed that the only plausible basis for the
choice was the partner’s tangible effectiveness to benefit the Claimant in his ability to
access senior decision-makers, with whom he had cultivated connections, and
exercised influence. 182 It further explained that having access to government power is
a valuable asset to bring to such a project controlled by the State’s senior figures.
Accordingly, being a paid lobbyist does not necessarily stigmatize his influential role
as corrupt. 183 It is not corruption in the absence of either direct or circumstantial
evidence that this influence included any back-channel influence.184
Although this conclusion is reiterated in international arbitration practice,185 it
deserves to be criticized. The Tribunal’s rationale ignored a clear significance on a
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possible corrupt role of this intermediary in the project. And, it was actually biased
against Egypt as to bring ex officio a plausible explanation on behalf of the Claimant
who, in light of this circumstantial evidence, ought to give more credible explanation.
b. The Proportionality Between Services and Remuneration
Following an established principle in arbitral practice, the Tribunal in Union Fenosa
avoided evaluating the proportionality between payments made by the Claimant for
the services rendered by the partner’s company due to the commercial nature of these
transactions.
The Tribunal recognized the exaggeration generosity of the remuneration paid
by the Claimant to the partner’s company in return for the services rendered to the
project. This occurred even though the Tribunal refused to second-guess the
underlying conditions according to which the Claimant should have paid.186 The
Tribunal enumerated some of these services as perceived from the adduced evidence
and it concluded that the reward should be viewed as “a commercial matter for
negotiation and agreement between the parties at the time.”187 Declining to question
the legitimacy of the generous payments, the Tribunal took into account the parties’
originally-envisaged plans to develop a longer relationship and concluded that these
payments did not constitute part of a corrupt scheme relating to the project.188
No doubt, this conclusion is reiterated in arbitration practice. In Lunik v.
Soliman, the arbitrator emphasizes the hardship of measuring the services provided by
a consultant in concluding that:
[t]he very nature of the agent’s or the sponsor’s activity, and
especially his insider influence with the [public purchasing
entity], … is at odds with the idea that it would be possible to
on an amicable and for free basis. The Tribunal specifically declared that “[t]he privileged and uncontested
relations between the family of the claimant and the [public official] would rather have been of such a nature as to
facilitate the efforts of the claimant and the obtaining of useful information, on an amicable and free basis, without
any corruption being necessary or envisaged.” Moreover, the possibility of employing such a relation did not raise
great concern for the arbitrators in another ICC case when the tribunal acknowledged the excellent connections
between a consultant and a senior public figure which enabled the former to obtain “important information and to
exert a certain influence on the decision to be taken.” ICC Case no. 4145, collection of ICC Arbitral Awards, Vol
II, p. 53, at p. 62, par. 62.
186

Union Fenosa, Supra note 9, Para 7.88.

187

Id.

188

Id.

67

control or measure the services or the diligences accomplished by
[the consultant], which remuneration, according to the contract,
does not depend on working hours effectively spent, or on the
number of personnel used or the number of letters or documents
drafted.189
Indeed, this view reflects the arbitrators’ wide discretionary power to assess
the proportionality between services rendered by consultants and remuneration they
receive. However, this power was misused by the tribunal that disregarded another
clear evidence of corruption on the part of the investor and the role of the Egyptian
intermediary.
c. The Partner’s Identity and Status
The Tribunal emphasized that this partner’s identity and status was obvious. He and
his company’s participations in the project were not passive from the outset. This fact
defies the possibility of being such a covert peddler of influence.190
This inference reflects the approach of the tribunal in ICC case No. 6497. In
this case, the defendant was a contractor who resisted commission payments to an
allegedly corrupt consultant and argued that the consultant’s identity was not
transparent. However, the tribunal did not draw from the ambiguities about the
consultant’s internal organization any adverse conclusion. It found that “[t]his
argument is not conclusive for deciding which was the real object of the agreements
between the parties and if bribes were paid in fact.”191
For the purpose of analyzing the adduced evidence, the Tribunal decided to
scrutinize the documents that Egypt relied upon to substantiate the case of corruption.
It studied each document individually in the context of other related evidence
presented through the proceedings. Next, it examined the allegation more broadly
through the accumulation of evidence. In all cases, it reached a conclusion that Egypt
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did not meet the set standard of proof to establish the case of corruption on the part of
the investor and the influential Egyptian partner.
This explanation should be viewed in light of two main facts. First, the
Tribunal opted to find a convincing explanation to serious incidents about the
Egyptian partner’s role, especially in light of the Claimant’s weakness. Given that,
the Tribunal’s explanation, as pointed out by the dissenting opinion, “indeed flies in
the face of Claimant’s own denials that [the Egyptian partner] exerted any influence
on government officials at all.”192
However, it is my contention that the Tribunal found it more convenient to
reach more affirmative answers to the questions of corruption instead of taking the
position of the tribunal in ICC case No. 6497 in which it resorted to the counterevidence to refute the allegation of corruption based on some relevant evidence.193 In
effect, the Tribunal explicitly stated that “The legal burden of proving corruption rests
upon the party alleging corruption; and it is not discharged by placing the burden on
the adverse party to prove the absence of corruption.”194
Second, employing circumstantial evidence led the Tribunal to discard
allegation of corruption, particularly while knowing that there was no proof of any
fund passed from the consultant or his company to senior officials. Accordingly, the
case of bribery was dismissed. What more is, the Tribunal stressed on the fact that
neither the businessman nor the concerned decision-makers were prosecuted in
relation to the contested contract. In passing, it criticized Egypt’s argument that the
contract was conducted in violation to its domestic laws, as it was invoked after more
than ten years during which several amendments had been made to it.
2. Non-Addressing of Evidentiary Matters: WDF vs. Kenya

192

Union Fenosa, supra note 9, at. 5. Para. 17: Dissenting Opinion of Mark Clodfelter

193

ICC Case no. 6497, supra note 160.

194

Union Fenosa, supra note 9, par. 7.113. Being Conservative to accept this view, the dissenting opinion of Mark
Clodfelter contend that there was a clear red flag “sufficient, not to shift to Claimant a burden of proving that there
was no corruption, as worries the majority, but to require Claimant to go forward with, at very least, a plausible
and credible explanation.” Supra note 136 at 4 para. 16.

69

The particular significance of WDF vs. Kenya stems from the reference made in the
Omar Effendi decision to its principle with regard to the inadmissibility of contract of
corruption claims before international arbitration. The Court particularly cited the
Tribunal’s statement that “claims based on contracts of corruption or on contracts
obtained by corruption cannot be upheld by this Arbitral Tribunal.”195 Therefore,
finding the basis on which the tribunal in WDF vs. Kenya deducted the proof of
corruption is a prerequisite to manifest the fallacy of the Court’s imitation.
a. Key Facts of WDF vs. Kenya
The contested contract in this case was concluded between a foreign investor and the
Kenya Airports Authority for the purpose of construction, maintenance, and operation
of duty-free complexes at international airports in Kenya.196 The project began in
1988 when the investor began to consider diversifying his investments in specific
African countries, and he decided to begin in Kenya.197
Therefore, upon the assistance and the advice of a Kenyan businessman who
had close connections to the President of the state, a meeting was arranged with the
latter at his residence. The purpose of this meeting was to obtain necessary licenses
and authorizations for the establishment of the project, and the Kenyan intermediary’s
advice included the investor making a personal donation to the President during the
meeting in accordance with a Kenyan cultural practice.198
Following the investor’s approval, the intermediary arranged for a meeting in
which the former brought two million USD, exchanged by the intermediary into the
domestic currency, to the President’s residence.199 The President approved the
proposed investment and suggested that the investor meet other public officials. After
a series of meetings, the concerned governmental affiliate concluded a ten-year
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renewable lease with the investor’s company on 27th of April 1989.200 The contract
was governed by the law of the host state, and the clause of arbitration stipulated the
English law to be applied to resolve any dispute arising thereof.201
A few years later, a dispute arose between the investor and the Kenyan
government due to the refusal of the investor to allow his company’s name to be used
in allegedly illegal activities, including fraud, conducted by the President and one of
his deputies.202 The Kenyan courts issued judicial orders which resulted in the
expropriation of investment as the project ownership was transferred to a Kenyan
politician.203
The investor initiated ICSID arbitration. The Chief Executive Officer and
shareholder of World Duty Free provided a full written statement included a detailed
testimony regarding the meeting with the President of the state and the two million
USD payment.204 Immediately, Kenya raised the issue of corruption and requested the
dismissal of the claim. The respondent’s basis was that the contract under
examination was procured by bribery; therefore, it is unenforceable under the
applicable law and international public policy.205
b. Deduction with No Burden of Proof Required
The determinant factor that the tribunal had to administer is whether the two million
USD payment constituted a bribe, and whether obtaining the contract was the legal
consequence of bribery.206 The investor contended that since Kenyan law is the
applicable law to the contract, this payment was not unlawful, but rather was
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considered as a “gift of protocol or a personal donation… to be used for public
purposes within the framework of the Kenyan [cultural tradition].”207
However, the Tribunal declined to perceive this payment as a lawful gift. It
believed that this payment was a bribe paid in exchange for procuring business with
the host state’s government. It traced the sequence of events from the beginning in
order to dispute the investor’s argument that the concealed payments were a personal
donation for public purposes.
The Tribunal followed the chronicle of the events. The starting point was
when the investor requested the advice of his Kenyan peer (knowing his close ties to
the state’s President) to obtaining the necessary authorizations for the former
prospective investment in Kenya. The next point existed when he showed his
approval of the payment of two million USD. Finally, the examine reached the
concluding of the agreement with the Kenyan government. It insisted that “those
payments were made not only in order to obtain an audience with [the President], but
above all to obtain during that audience the agreement of the President on the
contemplated investment.”208
Giving a particular scrutiny to the consequences of bribery under the
applicable law and transnational public policy,209 the Tribunal concluded that
agreement based on corruption or was obtained by bribery must be dismissed.210
The peculiarity in WDF v. Kenya is that the Tribunal needed not to address
evidentiary matters,211 because the claim itself did not turn on legal presumptions,
statutory deeming provisions, or different standards of proof under the applicable
law.212 The main evidence that the Tribunal relied on was driven from the claimant’s
own testimony submitted in a written statement. Certainly, with this direct
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uncontested evidence, the Tribunal needed not to search for answers to the questions
of proof as frequently opted to in most cases of corruption.213
3. Deducting Proof Ex Officio: Metal Tech vs. Uzbekistan214
The Metal Tech vs. Uzbekistan case involved an Investor-State dispute initiated under
the 1994 Israel-Uzbekistan Bilateral Investment Treaty.215 According to the first
article of this treaty,216 the protection is limited to investment implemented in
accordance with the laws and regulations of the host state.
a. Key Facts of Metal Tech vs. Uzbekistan
The Claimant was a foreign company that had formed with two other State-owned
entities a joint venture by concluding the constituent contract on 28 January 2000,217
to build and operate a plant for the production of molybdenum products (Uzmetal) in
Uzbekistan.218 Six years later, criminal proceedings were initiated by the host state’s
public prosecution against Uzmetal’s officials alleging abuse of authority.219
Subsequent developments had led to judicial orders resulting in the liquidation of the
plant assets.220
On January 26, 2010 Metal-Tech commenced arbitration proceedings on the
ground that the host state violated its obligations under its law, the BIT, and
customary international law.221 During the proceedings, Uzbekistan objected to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the basis that the Claimant obtained its investment by
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bribing public officials.222 The host state’s criminal investigations disclosed that this
investment included kickback payments to government senior officials223. On the
hearing, the Claimant’s Chairman and Chief Executive officer disclosed that, during
the negotiations of the main contract of the project, the Chairman has concluded
consultancy agreements with three Uzbek citizens, knowing that one of them was the
brother of the then-Prime Minister, and the second was working in the office of the
President of the State.224
The Tribunal has deduced main facts which it considered determinative of the
outcome of the proceedings. It lists that the consultants were paid a total of roughly
four million USD. This sum of money exceeded the Metal-Tech’s initial cash
contribution to the project, and amounted to nearly 20% of the entire project cost.225
And, it was paid through offshore companies to foreign bank accounts;226 received
the last payment in the same month when the President officially dismissed the Prime
Minister (one of the consultants’ brothers),227 and disproportionally remunerated,
irrespective of any services provided (in light of the claimant’s repeated failure to
provide evidence justifying the legitimate services in return) or possessing any
particular qualifications of consultancy.228
b. The Tribunal’s Power to Call Ex Officio for Evidence
The Tribunal at the outset maintained that since the establishment of the State’s
responsibility was sought upon the breach of its international obligations, it was
appropriate to apply the principle of international law as to the burden of proof, i.e.
each party has the burden of proving the facts on which it relies.229 However, taking
into consideration the divergence in the parties’ positions on burden and standard of
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proof,230 the Tribunal questioned the viability of this debate to resolve their dispute
while the relative facts did not require the application of the rules on burden of proof
or presumptions.231
In effect, the Tribunal exercised its power ex officio to inquire about the
reasons of the payment of those substantial sums according to the claimant’s
acknowledgment.232 The Tribunal found that these facts were not alleged by the
respondent, rather it emerged during the course of arbitration; therefore, it invited the
parties ex officio to provide additional testimony and evidence.233
This inquiry resulted in finding that corruption was established to an extent
sufficient to violate Uzbekistan law with regard to the establishment of the claimant’s
investment. Accordingly, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it lacked
Jurisdiction over the claim.234
Following the Tribunal’s explanation in WDF vs. Kenya,235 but without
resorting to the concept of transnational public policy, the Tribunal in Metal-Tech
declared that findings on corruption often come down on claimants while, as may be
seen at first sight, it exonerated the other party who itself may have been involved in
corruption. However, the Tribunal continued, the issue is not to punish one of the
parties, rather it must be seen to promote the rule of law, which gives no room for a
tribunal to assist a party that has engaged in a corrupt act.236
B. Judging the Decision of Omar Effendi Before International Arbitration
The previously demonstrated scholarly writings and international arbitral awards lead
to several alarming questions about the Court’s findings and conclusion in Omar
Effendi. The Court’s legal analysis has triggered a sequence of legal missteps,
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particularly with regard to issues of jurisdiction, admissibility, and evidentiary
matters and burden of proof.
1. Jurisdiction
The first legal blunder appears when the Court ex officio argued that its decision
should not be viewed as a prejudice against the investor. It claimed that it had full
jurisdiction over the relevant dispute, as a result of the absence of any settlement
mechanism included in the Agreement on Economic, Commercial, investment, and
technical Cooperation between Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the
investor’s State of nationality, hereinafter KSA).237 However, both Egypt and KSA
have ratified the Agreement for Promotion, Protection, and Guarantee of Investment
among the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Conference.238 According to
article 17 of this Agreement, parties are entitled to resort to arbitration if their dispute
is not to be settled through conciliation,239 besides, arbitral awards are final and
cannot be contested.240
The Court depended only on the provisions of the bilateral agreement between
Egypt and KSA and considered that the domestic judiciary must have the jurisdiction
of the dispute. Although there was a functioning mechanism set by another
multilateral convention, both the countries have ratified it. Thus, the investor has the
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right to resort to international arbitration under the auspice of this convention
irrespective of the Court’s decision.
The second fault with regard to the issue of jurisdiction existed as the Court
assumed its competency to decide upon the admissibility of the investor’s potential
resorting to arbitration. It ignored a fundamental principle of arbitration, which is
competence-competence, according to which, the arbitral tribunal has the power to
decide upon its own jurisdiction, including “any objections with respect to the
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.”241 Accordingly, national courts do
not have the authorization to decide in advance whether a party is entitled to initiate a
claim before arbitration. Its decision in such a matter is unproductive and does not
affect the competence power of arbitration.
Next, the Court superficially read article 25 of the Convention concerning the
ICSID jurisdiction over investor-State disputes. It declared that since both Egypt and
KSA have ratified the Convention, therefore, the jurisdiction to submit their dispute to
the Centre must be in writing.242
It is true that consent in writing is the only formal requirement in this
convention according to article 25, and must be obtained from all concerned parties,
yet, this consent is not limited to a single form.243 Accordingly, it may be recorded in
a direct agreement between the parties,244 such as a separate agreement or an
investment application.245 Alternatively, it can be found in a host state legislation,
therefore, it expresses its unilateral acceptance in advance to submit prospective
investment disputes to the ICSID jurisdiction, accordingly, this offer could be
accepted by foreign investors to become binding.
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In ICSID case no. ARB/84/3,246 Egypt enshrined its consent to the jurisdiction
of the Center in a piece of domestic legislation,247 so the foreign investor directly
initiated the case without prior ‘written agreement’, however, Egypt challenged the
jurisdiction on the ground that its legislation set other alternatives that made the
article too ambiguous to establish consent. The Tribunal rejected this stance because it
found that the legislation set a “mandatory and hierarchic sequence of dispute
settlement procedures, and constituted an express consent in writing within the
meaning of article 25 (1)”248
In Omar Effendi, the contested contract was governed by law no. 8/ 1997.
According to article 8 therein, Egypt expressed its consent to submitting investment
disputes to the ICSID arbitration.249 Therefore, there was explicit consent in
accordance with the requirements of the Convention and as applied in SSP vs. Egypt.
2. Admissibility
The Court in Omar Effendi cited the WDF vs. Kenya’s principle that established that
“bribery is contrary to … transnational public policy. Thus, claims based on contracts
of corruption or contracts obtained by corruption cannot be upheld by this arbitral
tribunal.”250 However, in WDF vs. Kenya, the tribunal faced an unequivocal case of
bribery.
The Tribunal’s conclusion was established on the sequence of incidents, not
on assumptions. It pointed out that the payment was made and handed over by the
investor to the President in order to obtain the necessary authorizations of his project.
This incident came after the intermediary’s advice and his effective role in facilitating
246
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the meeting between the investor and the President and resulted in approving the
investor’s plans and led to concluding the agreement. Thus, it concluded that,
chronically, the payment was a bribe paid in exchange for procuring investment.
On the contrary, nothing in Omar Effendi’s facts referred to the issue of
bribery as a criminal activity. The Court repeatedly invoked the issue of dissipation of
public wealth, it then equated this issue to corruption. However, dissipation of public
wealth is not equivalent to corruption from the lens of international arbitration,
because bribery, as one form of corruption must be intentional and deliberately
committed, but the dissipation of a country’s wealth can be unintentionally
committed.
Indeed, the transaction of selling the Omar Effendi Company witnessed a
catastrophic violation of the national law, however, this is not a sound ground that can
be heard before international arbitration. The Tribunal rejected Egypt’s allegation that
was built on the breach of its domestic bidding law. The Tribunal asserted that “even
if correct, this breach can support no inference of corruption by the [investor]in
circumstances where the [contract] was approved in draft by the Egyptian Council of
Ministers and, after its execution, endorsed by the Minister of Petroleum.”251
In effect, the Court reached a wrong conclusion when it considered the serious
violation encompassed the transaction as amounting to acts of corruption as
established in international arbitration. I believe that the Court misused the term
“corruption” to stigmatize these severe violations and in order to equate it to
“corruption” that is condemned in international arbitration.
3. Evidentiary Matters and Burden of Proof
Analyzing the adduced evidence with regard to the allegation of corruption varies
from one tribunal to another, especially when there is no direct and cogent evidence.
Accordingly, when a tribunal depends on the accumulation of circumstantial
evidence, along with its wide discretionary power, the result is always unpredictable.
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In Omar Effendi, the Court assumed that the encompassed circumstantial
evidence produced serious suspicion of corruption, and later it affirmed that there is
actually corruption existed. Contrarily, the Tribunal in Union Fenosa was amenable to
view all the raised suspicions in favor of denial of corruption although it admitted that
there was a tremendous and unexplained discrepancy between the intermediary’s
participation and the compensation he was awarded. The Tribunal further commented
that “[s]uspicion is not equivalent to proof.”252
While in Metal-Tech, the Tribunal had clear evidence that there were
payments made by the investor for services of consultancy, having found that these
payments have roughly amounted to 20% of the entire project triggered further
questions. Similarly, in WDF vs. Kenya, the Tribunal faced unequivocal proof of
paying two million USD to the State’s President before obtaining the investment.
As for the standard and burden of proof, the recognition of the hardship of
proving corruption by direct cogent evidence led the Tribunal in Union Fenosa to set
a low standard of proof. This standard of proof apparently was dependent on the
accumulation of circumstantial evidence. As a result, it retained the balance of
probabilities, and expected Egypt to bear the burden of proof as per the general
rules.253
However, the Tribunal found that Egypt has failed to produce sufficient
evidence to the allegation of corruption, and it considered that all the presented
circumstantial evidence was not reasonably connected to produce a convincing result
of bribery. On the contrary, both the Tribunals in Metal-Tech and WDF vs. Uzbekistan
needed not to engage in evidentiary matters, only because they were convinced by the
direct clear evidence admitted by the investors themselves.
To that end, the Court’s conclusion with regard to the inadmissibility of the
investor’s potential claims before the ICSID arbitration was clearly rife with
unreasonableness. Certainly, even the most extremist proponent to the repressive
tendency in evaluating corruption would dispute that rationale, either with relation to
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the elements that constituted corruption, or concerning the standard and the extent of
proof.
This conclusion is proven by what the arbitral tribunal affirmed in Misr-Shibin
Textile when the Court adopted the same rationale. The investor, upon the loss of his
investment due to the Court’s stance, resorted to the ICSID arbitration regardless of
the Court’s decision, and the available information indicates that the case was
concluded.254
C. Consequences of Omar Effendi
As presented in chapter two, the Court in Omar Effendi was motivated by its
responsibility towards the dissipated publicly-owned assets and its duty to retain
Egyptians’ properties.
The decision was synchronized with the political instability that took place
then, which gave room for delivering an untraditional form of judicial decisions. The
Court linked between the transaction in question and the State’s submission to foreign
governments and international institutions’ unfair policy to devastate Egypt’s
economy and to dissipate its public wealth.
In his article Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, Moustafa explains
that authoritarian regimes generally use law and courts as instruments of political
control.255 However, regimes’ interests have never been advanced through judicial
institutions straightforwardly. On the contrary, litigation before these courts enables
activists to initiate high-profile cases challenging the regime’s radical policies.256 He
emphasizes the strategic position judges occupy in the interpretation, application, and
reviewing of regime legislations. This position entitles them to produce, through their
identities and aspirations, their own perception of the rule of law that ought to contain
substantive conceptions of fundamental rights.257
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This explanation can best describe the Court’s activism shown in Omar
Effendi, Misr-Shibin Textile, Tanta linen, and other identical decisions. As Moustafa
illustrates, reform-minded judges in authoritarian regimes may test their limits and
give radical solutions to influence the direction of political reform.258
Granted that, the historical context of Omar Effendi and the subsequent
decisions encouraged the Court to produce its own perception with regard to retaining
the privatized assets. Unfortunately, this attempt was at the expense of justice, the rule
of law, and the State’s economic interests.259
1. Legal Consequences
The Court’s attempt to rectify the government’s faults in privatizing publicly-owned
enterprises led to legal peculiar outcomes. For instance, it demolished the legislator’s
aim that targeted protecting investments,260 brought an unprecedented language to the
field of judicial decisions, and it appeared biased against individuals’ rights and
interests which resulted in jeopardizing the credibility of the judiciary.
First, attracting direct foreign investment was one of the strategies that the
Egyptian governments pursued starting the 1990s. Therefore, law no. 8/ 1997
equivocally prohibited nationalization or expropriation of the investors’ properties.261
However, the Omar Effendi decision clearly confiscated the investor’s investment.
The Court rendered the sale contract null and void. Accordingly, the sold
enterprise’s ownership was transmitted again to the NCBC and the investor was
entitled to receive what he paid, but what had been paid for the assets was not
equivalent to its value after many years. Not to mention, the loss that the investor
faced due to what was spent on promoting and developing the Company during these
years. Hence, the Court reversed the legislator’s policy with regard to the prohibition
of expropriating investments.
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Second, the Court presented unfamiliar language. It used aggressive language
in which it randomly charged an undefined number of politicians of being corrupt and
for receiving bribes.262 Furthermore, it accused them of conspiring with, and being
subjected to the influence of foreign governments and international financial
institutions to devastate the national economy.263 The accusations extended to include
all the investors as being corrupt and an integrated part of the conspiracy targeted the
Country’s economy.
This unconventional language gave an indication that the Court did not
examine the case on a purely legal basis. Rather, it built its belief on assumptions and
suspicions. This manner, along with expropriating the investors’ properties, definitely
leads to worsening Egypt’s case before the ICSID arbitration in potential claims in
light of the fair and equitable principle.
Third, the decision’s main negative legal effect exists in disregarding vital
rights, interests, and considerations. In particular, the Court disregarded the wellknown destructive consequences that must follow deciding the nullity of a sale
contract that was concluded and executed for a long time.264
As a case in point, the decision disregarded the investor’s rights who
concluded the contract with the competent governmental authorities and in
accordance with its conditions.265 This investor, in turn, made subsequent legal
transactions, including real estate mortgage with other financial institutions. One
should ask if the Court decided to disregard the investor’s interests on account of their
assumed corruption, why the Court did disregard the other parties’ interests where
they made separate transactions in good-faith.
Nullifying the sale contract led to considering such a contract as if it was not
ever concluded, this outcome led to odds that cannot be rectified, especially when this
contract has been concluded and executed for many years. This particular result
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forced the government to address the State Council seeking its legal opinion to
explain how this decision should be forced in light of the elapsed time.266
Finally, this activism was made at the expense of justice and the
considerations of public policy. Accusing the parties and other undefined numbers of
public figures of being corrupts led to unacceptable intervention from that
administrative Court in the jurisdiction of the competent criminal courts. No doubt,
this stance must lead to a conflict between two judicial bodies and probably opposing
outcomes that eventually lead to questioning their integrity and credibility.
2. Tangible Consequences
The Court attempted to defend the nation’s interest, but that was through a series of
legal faults. For instance, considering “citizenship” suffices to challenge contracts
concluded between others encouraged some individuals to exploit the judiciary to
blackmail investors.267
The Court expressed its strong motivation as to protect public wealth and to
retain the assets of sold publicly-owned entities to the State, but its judgment did not
empower the State’s economy. On the contrary, it led to a number of arbitration
claims before the international arbitration,268 such as the case of Indorama,269 and the
case of Tanta Linen.270 The outcomes of resorting to arbitration can be easily
anticipated in light of the ICSID’s previously mentioned position in this kind of
claims, which in turn would cost the Egyptian government more financial burdens to
compensate the investors for expropriation.
Furthermore, the decision conflicted with the economic plans that the
government followed to dispose of these entities due to the losses it faced, and that is
266
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definitely added other burdens on the government. As a case in point, the government
did not wish or plan to retrieve these sold enterprises and did not expect to be obliged
to pay the investors the price which was already employed in its budget years ago.
The Court claimed that it empowered the investment environment. However,
the result of its decision cannot be seen as an incentive for investment. Certainly, no
investor may risk their investments that were made in accordance with the host state’s
laws and governmental approvals, especially when these investments could be
expropriated at an indefinite period of time due to a similar judicial review.271
The Court’s rationale jeopardized the investment ambiance and weakened the
Country’s investment credibility, which did not give the post-2011 governments much
breathing space in negotiations with investors to conclude conciliations in order to
avoid the expected results of resorting to international arbitration.
3. The Other Way not Taken
Now I hypothesize that the Court did not yield to the temptation of the then political
and societal context. And, that it did not extremely exercise that judicial activism lest
being liable for participating in the disposition of publicly-owned wealth, so it simply
applied the law correctly and followed the profoundly legal principles and judicial
precedents.
For this reason, first, the Court should have built its reasoning on purely legal
consideration. Inserting irrelevant facts and considerations affected the Court’s
integrity and impartiality, and made the assumption that it was biased against the
case’s parties more convincing and most probable.
This particular point would lead to worsening Egypt’s case before the ICSID
arbitration that, as witnessed from the previous demonstration, would easily favor the
investor’s interests and would be keen to refute allegations of corruption even when
the adduced circumstantial evidence is sufficient.
Second, it should not have contravened domestic public policy considerations.
Its jurisdiction should not have been extended to judicially review the case subject
271
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matter, because the contested contract was neither an administrative contract nor was
the sold enterprise publicly-owned one.
In fact, this stance was manifested in a subsequent decision delivered from the
same Court with a different panel’s composition. In lawsuit no. 43213 of the judicial
year 65,272 the Court rejected to render another privatization contract null and void.
The Court affirmed that the sale contract was concluded in accordance with the
Companies Law no. 159/ 1981,273 and Public Sector Companies no. 203/ 1991.274
The Court explained that this sale contract should not be viewed as a result of
an administrative decision. Rather, a sale transaction conducted by a public sector
company that is legally entitled to sell its affiliate’s assets or shares according to Law
no. 203/ 1191. The Court added that the latter law aimed at achieving societal and
economic development, and it is the main source that governs all legal transactions of
the public sector companies.275
As a result, the claimant in Omar Effendi had no legal capacity to challenge a
contract that he was not one of its parties on the basis of his citizenship. Citizenship
cannot be considered a legitimate basis for challenging investment contracts.
Moreover, the arbitration clause included therein did not require the
prerequisite of the competent ministerial approval which was impliedly obtained
already. Accordingly, it should not disregarded a previous arbitral award issued in
accordance with that arbitral clause according to the res judicata rule.
Third, it should not have given another significant bias against the parties by
assuming their criminal liability according to panel law. It should not have placed
itself in the position of the public prosecution and the competent criminal court to
give that affirmative conclusion and to incent them to follow its rationale.
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Fourth, it should not have decided on the competence of the international
arbitration by citing the principle of transnational public policy, as it misused the
concept and gave false interpretation to its content. This stance had no impact on the
ICSID jurisdiction due to the competence-competence principle and surely is to be
neglected by arbitrators to potential claims.
However, this position added more suspicions that the Court’s biased attitude
most probably exists and give another reason for a tribunal to outweigh the investor’s
interests.276
The Court had the choice to discharge its judicial responsibility as to follow
these inherent rules, but affirmatively declaring its dissatisfaction with the severe
violations that encompassed the transactions.
It could have admitted its constitutional, judicial, and legislative boundaries,
along with expressing its national considerations with regard to the significance of
these assets and to condemn unfair criteria of evaluating and disposing of them.
It should also announce that it had to take the Egyptian people’s side by
avoiding worsening the Country’s financial crisis due to expected arbitration awards
and anticipated failure to manage these retained enterprises.
The Court also should have abstained from degrading Egypt’s investment
ambiance through expropriating investors’ properties, disregarded banks’ and
individuals’ rights and economic interests.
In conclusion, the Court should have made a careful balance between conflict
interests. It should have avoided the influence of the contextual atmosphere, which
weakened its rationale. The Court would deliver less harmful consequences if it had
safeguarded Egypt’s long-term interests by avoiding nullifying legal transactions that
took place years ago, which resulted in a sequence of stable rights. This is instead of
focusing on the near future gain, which turned out to be a great loss that affected the
Egypt’s judiciary, economy, and investment credibility.
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VI.

Conclusion

The pre-2011 governments urged to get rid of its affiliates’ industrial and commercial
enterprises, as they were viewed as burdens on the economy, so it decided in
collaboration with foreign governments and international financial institutions to
privatize these entities. However, some enterprises were hard to be disposed of due to
their particular conditions, so that the competent body chose to violate its own
regulatory measures, or not to object to these violations happening at best, to facilitate
concluding the sale transactions.
Like the case was in Omar Effendi, there was a severe violation of law and
regulations in order to conclude its sale contract, particularly, with regard to the
evaluation process of its assets. Four years later, the revolutionary context that
prevailed after the 25 January 2011 revolution incited many individuals to challenge
the legitimacy of these transactions before the State Council.
The Court reacted to these lawsuits under the influence of that current. It
delivered a poor decision in which it was motivated by national considerations rather
than justice and rule of law considerations.
The Court in Omar Effendi committed numerous legal faults in which it
reversed well-established legal principles and inherent judicial precedents. It was
aspired to render the sale contract of the Company null and void in order to rectify the
odd results of privatization; however, it equally violated the law.
Hence, it violated domestic laws and public policy consideration with regard
to the claimant’s capacity, the nature of the contested contract, its own jurisdiction to
decide on the case’s subject matter and on the validity of the arbitral clause. The
violations extended to include deciding on the parties’ criminal liability and the
validity of a previous arbitral award rendered on the same conflict.
What more is, the Court’s motivations led it to adopt an unprecedented form
of reasoning. Accordingly, it considered that the contested contract was a result of a
criminal act that targeted destroying the Egyptian economy and dissipating its public
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wealth and that both the ex-political elite and foreign investors were corrupt and
concluded their contracts corruptly.
On the international level, it anticipated the investor’s resorting to
international arbitration, so it wanted to show that it was not biased against the
investor. It first affirmed that the ICSID has no jurisdiction over the dispute, then it
cited WDF vs. Kenya which turns contracts of corruption inadmissible before the
ICSID arbitration in light of the concept of transnational public policy.
Granted that, the paper explained the concept of public policy in general, and
crystalized the concept of transnational public policy in particular. It further illustrated
that the Court’s logic was wrong. It shows that it made a series of legal faults in light
of the domestic law in order to stigmatize the sale contract as corrupt, and that
rationale does not fit in the realm of international arbitration when the allegation of
corruption is raised.
The thesis analyzed the different approaches of different arbitral tribunals with
regard to perceiving evidentiary matters, the analysis of adduced evidence, and
matters related to the burden of proof. It showed that there is a great discrepancy
amongst these tribunals in administering issues of evaluating the adduced evidence,
which in turn makes the outcome of raising the challenge of corruption unpredictable.
The Thesis then compared the position of the Court with that of the Tribunal
in Union Fenosa when Egypt used the Court’s rationale to substantiate its defense
with regard to the existence of corruption on the part of the investor. It also presented
other patterns when corruption was manifested. It eventually argued that the Court
was completely wrong about deciding on the inadmissibility of the Omar Effendi
investor’s potential claims before the ICSID.
This study did not aim at comparing the Court’s rationale in Omar Effendi
with the Tribunal’s rationale in Union Fenosa in order to prove that the latter’s
methodology is more convenient, or that the Court should have followed the
Tribunal’s rationale. On the contrary, the thesis explained that the Tribunal’s rationale
in respect of excluding the allegation of corruption is criticized as well. However, the
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purpose of this comparison was to show that the Court’s position would lead to
worsening Egypt’s defense in potential claims before the ICSID arbitration.
The thesis eventually argued that the Court’s noble intentions did not yield to
what it aspired. It gave wrong legal analysis to the subject matters in question, and
wrong legal answers to the non-contested subject matters. On the contrary, it was
biased against the parties to the case before it, added unmanageable burdens on the
economy, and jeopardized the notions of justice and rule of law.
In fact, the Court’s noble motivation to empower the national economy and
safeguard public ownership was actually a weapon directed at justice, rule of law, and
Egypt’s economy and investment credibility.
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